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The Bailout Through a Public Choice Lens: 
Government-Controlled Corporations as a Mechanism 
for Rent Transfer 
J.W. Verret ∗ 
The purse & the sword ought never to get into the same hands 
whether Legislative or Executive. — George Mason
1
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Through the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) bailout, 
the government took a controlling interest in a number of companies 
that remain publicly traded.  There is significant prior debate over 
the consequences of government control of private-sector resources, 
but the present dynamic of government ownership through voting 
equity in publicly traded equity is fairly novel in the modern U.S. 
economy.  This Article considers how the government is likely to put 
political pressure on firms taking bailout support through its equity 
voting power to cater to politically influential interest groups. 
This Article first explores a number of instances of government 
pressure at bailed-out firms that have worked in favor of politically in-
fluential interest groups.  It then explains the process by which this 
occurs through a novel contribution to public choice theory.  This 
contribution treats rent-seeking as a two-step process by which gov-
ernment-controlled firms use their politically conferred rents to sub-
sidize transfers to interest groups.  The Article also examines the in-
centives facing bureaucrats in overseeing the government’s 
investment. 
This Article then considers the constraints of administrative law 
and reveals how in this context they offer little remedy against the 
public choice conflicts of government-controlled firms.  In part this is 
 
 ∗ Assistant Professor, George Mason University School of Law.  I appreciate help-
ful comments from Todd Zywicki, Fred McChesney, and Henry Manne.  I appreciate 
the support of the George Mason University School of Law Center for Law and Eco-
nomics, as well as the support of the Corporate Federalism Initiative at the George 
Mason University School of Law. 
 1 JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 81 
(Ohio Univ. Press 1984) (1840). 
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due to the exceptions to administrative law constraints found in the 
bailout legislation, but in larger part it is due to the fact that the gov-
ernment’s power is often implicit in this context. 
This Article closes with an examination of the TARP Recipient 
Ownership Trust Act, which would house the government’s invest-
ment in a number of trusts governed by independent trustees, which 
among other provisions is designed to serve as a buffer between polit-
ical pressure and private industry.
2
  This Article also offers criticism of 
a counter-proposal from Professor Emma Coleman Jordan, issued 
through the Center for American Progress, that requires nomination 
of “public directors” to the Boards of bailout recipients who are ac-
countable directly to the government.
3
 
The result is a thorough understanding of how public choice 
theory offers some predictions for how the government will use its 
controlling investment in bailout recipients and an understanding of 
whether, and to what extent, properly designed trusts can limit some 
of these costs. 
II. INTRODUCTION TO GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS: 
THE TARP BAILOUT 
The primary objective of this Article is to shed light on how the 
government can be expected to act in the management of its control-
ling equity holding in the large private firms in which it has a control-
ling equity interest.  The firms covered by this analysis include Amer-
ican International Group, Inc. (AIG), Citigroup, General Motors 
(GM), Chrysler, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and dozens of other large 
banks and financial companies.  To lay a foundation for the discus-
sion, some history of the bailout of 2008 that precipitated (or in the 
case of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, more deeply entrenched) the 
government’s controlling ownership is appropriate. 
Under the bailout authorization and other policy responses to 
the financial crisis of 2008, the federal government took a number of 
unprecedented steps that have enhanced the government’s control 
over private sectors of the U.S. economy.
4
  In addition to its control-
ling equity stake, the government’s power to regulate compensation 
for TARP recipients also enhanced its control.  For example, in re-
sponse to pay restrictions initiated by the government’s “pay czar,” 
 
 2 S. 1723, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 3594, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 3 See infra Part V.A. 
 4 For more analysis of the government’s status as a controlling shareholder in 
these firms, see J.W. Verret, Treasury Inc.: How the Bailout Reshapes Corporate Theory and 
Practice, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 299–307 (2010). 
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Robert Benmosche indicated his intent to resign as chief executive 
officer (CEO) of AIG.
5
  The government’s powers as a regulator also 
more generally enhanced its control over TARP firms. 
Control certainly does not require that the government own a 
majority of shares in companies; indeed courts that have looked into 
the question for the purposes of determining whether a government-
owned company is under government control and therefore, a state 
actor for purposes of constitutional restrictions, have examined the 
actual exercise of control by the government.
6
  Controlling equity 
ownership by the federal government also gives a company immunity 
from the market for corporate control, since various agencies within 
the government can threaten the viability of a merger proposal.
7
  
Thus for those bailout recipients in which the government is a sub-
majority shareholder its control is cemented more deeply. 
Through the TARP, which was one element of the bailout, the 
government ultimately invested roughly $245 billion in banks 
through stock purchases, roughly $70 billion of which remains out-
standing.
8
  The government also spent roughly $49.5 billion under 
the TARP bailing out GM, $14.9 billion doing the same for Chrysler, 
$13.4 billion on GMAC (the financing arm of GM), and $1.5 billion 
on Chrysler Financial.
9
  The government obtained control over deci-
sions at those firms through the bailout both through taking direct 
voting equity, as at GM,
10
 as well as indirectly through replacing board 
members, as at Chrysler.
11
  The government also took a controlling 
equity position in AIG in exchange for its $185 billion bailout of that 
company.
12
  GMAC and AIG in particular appear to remain unable to 
raise private capital and will need the government’s support for the 
 
 5 Liam Pleven et al., AIG’s Benmosche Threatens to Jump Ship, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 
2009, at C1. 
 6 Michael A. Froomkin, Reinventing the Government Corporation, 1995 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 543, 572–73 (1995). 
 7 Id. at 585. 
 8 Bob Davis et al., After the Bailouts, Washington’s the Boss, WALL ST. J., Dec. 28, 
2009, at A1.   
 9 OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF 
PROGRAM, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 46 (Oct. 21, 2009). 
 10 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Fact Sheet: Obama Administration 
Auto Restructuring Initiative, General Motors Restructuring (June 1, 2009), available 
at http://www.financialstability.gov/latest/05312009_gm-factsheet.html.  
 11 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Department Statement on 
Chrysler’s Board of Directors Appointments (July 5, 2009), available at 
http://www.financialstability.gov/latest/tg197.html. 
 12 Matthew Karnitschnig et al., U.S. to Take Over AIG in $85 Billion Bailout; Central 
Banks Inject Cash as Credit Dries Up, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2008, at A1.  
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foreseeable future.
13
  Finally, the government spent or offered guar-
antees of an initial $200 billion to take Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
under federal conservatorship, two firms that are likely to also need 
continued government support for the foreseeable future.
14
 
A. Specific Instances of Political Influence over Bailed-Out Firms 
This Article will examine the government as a controlling share-
holder in TARP firms through the lens of public choice theory.  Be-
fore that step, however, it may be helpful to survey some particular 
instances that evidence the public choice dynamic for government-
controlled firms described in this Article. 
A number of developments throughout the course of the bailout 
have highlighted the concerns about government ownership of busi-
ness ventures.  The government’s holdings at the automotive compa-
nies offer the most controversial examples.  The membership of the 
President’s Auto Task Force consists of a number of cabinet secreta-
ries and political appointees, including the administrator of the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency and the Secretary of Energy.
15
  After 
GM’s contract with a Montana palladium mine was nullified in bank-
ruptcy court and GM found a cheaper source overseas, Montana’s 
congressional delegation pressured GM to reinstate the contract at 
significant cost to the firm.
16
  Through a similar process, dealerships 
that closed under the GM bankruptcy were able to use congressional 
influence to pressure GM to reinstate the dealerships.
17
 
This Article will offer in part an argument that the government 
gives preferential regulatory treatment to the entities it controls.  For 
example, around the time that 600 of the nation’s banks—including 
most of the nation’s largest banks—received TARP funding in ex-
change for preferred stock, members of Congress pressured the ac-
counting industry to relax mark-to-market accounting rules for the 
banking industry.
18
  In an even starker example, the regulator for 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac has been explicitly instructed to make 
 
 13 Davis et al., supra note 8, at A1. 
 14 OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF 
PROGRAM, supra note 9, at 137. 
 15 See Neil King, Jr. & John D. Stoll, Auto Task Force Set to Back More Loans—With 
Strings, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 2009, at A1.  
 16 Neil King, Jr., Politicians Butt in at Bailed-Out GM, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2009, at 
A12.  
 17 Id. 
 18 Susan Pulliam & Tom McGinty, Congress Helped Banks Defang Key Rule, WALL ST. 
J., June 3, 2009, at A1. 
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the firms’ effort to cut monthly mortgage payments for American 
households its first priority,
19
 even at the risk of jeopardizing its own 
stakes in the firms’ capital structures to keep it financially viable. 
As an example of the distortionary effects of government guar-
antees on the private market, the Department of Energy’s generous 
$40 billion loan to businesses working on alternative energy technol-
ogy has caused much of the venture capital industry to focus on those 
firms able to obtain funding through negotiations with the govern-
ment rather than on firms able to germinate profitable ideas.
20
  Gov-
ernment funding is typically obtained by firms agreeing to build pro-
duction plants in congressional districts of influential legislators.
21
  
Large firms also play a similar game, as General Electric has offered 
its support to the Obama administration’s stimulus programs in ex-
change for a large share of stimulus project contracts.
22
 
The government’s interaction with bailed-out firms with whom 
the government develops fractious relationships is also informative 
for this Article’s thesis.  Bank of America’s (“BOA”) former CEO, Ken 
Lewis, announced his resignation on September 30, 2009, citing the 
difficulties of government supervision and government interference 
into the bank’s management policies as a central reason for his resig-
nation.
23
  After Lewis initially agreed to acquire Merrill Lynch, he 
considered backing out of the deal by exercising his contractual 
rights under the Material Adverse Change (“MAC”) clause in the 
deal.
24
  Federal Reserve and Treasury officials pushed Lewis not to 
exercise the MAC clause, but instead to proceed with the acquisition 
with the assistance of additional TARP loans out of concern that by 
backing out, BOA would cause investor panic and financial instabili-
ty.
25
  Secretary Paulson threatened to fire Lewis if he did not comply.
26
  
One e-mail communication between Federal Reserve officials indi-
cated their desire to get a “pound of flesh” from Lewis.
27
 
 
 19 Davis et al., supra note 8, at A1. 
 20 Neil King Jr., Venture Capitol: New VC Force, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 2009, at A18. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Elizabeth Williamson & Paul Glader, General Electric Pursues Pot of Government 
Stimulus Gold, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 2009, at A18.  
 23 Carrick Mollenkamp & Dan Fitzpatrick, With Fed, BofA’s Lewis Met His Match, 
WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 2009, at A1. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
VERRET FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/16/2010  1:10 PM 
1526 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1521 
Lewis argued that he was unsuitable for the job of running a 
bank under government ownership, as it required him to “kowtow to 
politicians and regulators.”
28
  Federal Reserve officials later filed a 
confidential memorandum of understanding against BOA registering 
concerns about governance and risk management, which BOA direc-
tors claimed were a direct result of BOA’s forced acquisition of Mer-
rill Lynch.
29
  In April 2009, six directors of BOA were replaced and 
three more directors stepped down under the direction of Federal 
Reserve officials.
30
  Lewis indicated a strong desire to repay TARP 
funds as quickly as possible.
31
  BOA’s attempt in the summer of 2009 
to repay part of its TARP funds was rebuffed by the government.
32
 
One of the central reasons Lewis was ultimately asked to leave 
BOA was his unwillingness to cooperate with the Obama administra-
tion to achieve its political goals.
33
  His replacement, Brian Moynihan, 
was chosen because of his assurances to the Obama administration 
that he would work with the White House to achieve their goals of in-
creasing small business lending and preventing foreclosures.
34
  The 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) brought an action 
against BOA alleging that BOA failed to disclose to its shareholders 
the extent to which Merrill Lynch employees were required to receive 
bonuses, resulting in a false disclosure to shareholders of the value of 
the Merrill Lynch acquisition.
35
  The SEC subsequently attempted to 
settle the case for a $33 million fine, but the judge in the case re-
jected the settlement as too lenient.
36
 
AIG, on the other hand, was much more willing to cooperate 
with the federal government, resulting in a far less tenuous relation-
ship.  AIG’s competitors have alleged that it is able to undercut com-
petitors’ prices because of its continued backing from the federal 
government.
37
  AIG’s former CEO, Ed Liddy, indicated that 
“[e]verything we do, we do in partnership with the Federal Reserve.”
38
  
 
 28 Id. 
 29 Mollenkamp & Fitzpatrick, supra note 23, at A1. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 See id. 
 34 Davis et al., supra note 8, at A1. 
 35 Mollenkamp & Fitzpatrick, supra note 23, at A1. 
 36 Zachery Kouwe, Judge Rejects Settlement over Merrill Bonuses, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 
2009, at A1. 
 37 Liam Pleven & Sudeep Reddy, AIG’s Rivals Blame Bailout for Tilting Insurance 
Game, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 2009, at A1. 
 38 Id. 
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In sales presentations, AIG boasted that its government backing low-
ers its cost of capital.
39
 
When Fannie Mae proposed to sell $3 billion in tax credits to 
Goldman Sachs and Berkshire Hathaway—credits that were valueless 
to Fannie Mae without operating profit against which to obtain the 
credit and that also directly harmed Fannie Mae’s balance sheet by 
requiring write-downs in value every quarter that Fannie Mae was not 
able to use them—the Treasury blocked the sale on the grounds that 
it would result in a net loss in tax revenue for the government.
40
 
A final example reveals how the government can use its leverage 
over a firm to acquire regulatory turf over competing independent 
government regulatory agencies.  When GMAC’s banking subsidiary, 
Ally Bank, decided to implement a strategy of offering higher rates to 
bank deposits, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) re-
sponded with an order that Ally Bank lower its rates on bank deposits 
and focus its auto lending to lower-end car buyers.
41
  The FDIC’s pub-
lic explanation for this pressure was that deposits acquired through 
competitive rates, particularly online, that are not based on bank 
loyalty are more prone to bank runs in times of panic.
42
  GMAC also 
faced pushback from the Federal Reserve to increase its capital re-
serves by accepting more loans from the Treasury.
43
  After being 
granted a charter as a bank-holding company, GMAC became subject 
to Federal Reserve regulation, but since its Ally Bank subsidiary is a 
state-chartered bank, it is subject to oversight by the FDIC.
44
  GMAC 
originally received $5 billion in TARP injections.
45
  The FDIC initially 
opposed a plan to inject additional capital into GMAC, but a deal was 
later negotiated by the Treasury in which GMAC would drop its plan 
to seek transfer of its charter to the Federal Reserve in exchange for 
the FDIC dropping its opposition to additional injections of capital 
into GMAC.
46
  Subsequently, the FDIC agreed to guarantee an addi-
tional $7.4 billion in GMAC debt, the Treasury injected an additional 
$7.5 billion in capital, and the Federal Reserve waived a rule prohibit-
 
 39 Id. 
 40 Nick Timiraos, Treasury Blocks the Sale of Tax Credits by Fannie, WALL ST. J., Nov. 
7, 2009, at B1. 
 41 Dan Fitzpatrick & Damian Paletta, U.S. Turns Screws on Bailed-Out GMAC, WALL 
ST. J., Nov. 2, 2009, at A1. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
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ing transfers of capital between bank-holding companies and their 
subsidiaries in order to permit GMAC to transfer capital to Ally 
Bank.
47
  In the end the regulatory turf battle was settled but only after 
Ally Bank agreed to the demands of all three regulators.
48
 
These situations provide clear examples of public choice dynam-
ics operating in the context of government-owned or government-
controlled firms.  The next step in this Article is to consider how pub-
lic choice theory can offer a more sophisticated explanation for the 
simple observations from these sources.  In doing so, the final step 
will consider whether there is any viable method to limit the tensions 
of public choice conflicts on government-owned or government-
controlled firms. 
III. PUBLIC CHOICE LITERATURE MEETS THE GOVERNMENT-
CONTROLLED CORPORATION 
In order to understand how the government will make decisions 
in the stewardship of its controlling equity interest in private compa-
nies, it is necessary to appreciate that government actors face incen-
tives just as private-market participants.  These incentives have been 
explored in depth in the literature of public choice theory.  This lite-
rature will be the primary lens for this Article’s analysis of govern-
ment as the controlling equity owner in companies.  One of the key 
insights public choice theory offers to the political science discipline 
is to break up the monolithic notion of government into a variety of 
institutional players who respond to differing incentives and utilize 
different forms of government power.  Public choice theory also of-
fers a wide range of insights into how groups supporting political 
candidates, companies supporting or attacking new regulations for 
various reasons, and bureaucrats seeking to enhance their own ca-
reers all contribute to a full understanding of the institutions at work 
in this context. 
A. Rent Seeking, Rent Dissipation, Rent Extraction, Rent Sharing, 
and a New Concept of Rent Transfers Considered 
The government itself has frequently expressed an outward de-
sire to minimize the influence of government pressure over bailout 
recipients
49
 despite the fact that its actions reveal an inability to stop 
 
 47 Fitzpatrick & Paletta, supra note 41, at A1. 
 48 Id. 
 49 See, e.g., Verret, Treasury Inc., supra note 4, at 295 (“The Treasury published a 
white paper regarding its ownership in GM in which it offered four key principles for 
how it would try to minimize political influence in GM’s operations . . .”). 
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the pressures of public choice conflicts.  In part, this view is informed 
by an abiding sentiment that the U.S. system of capitalism would be 
threatened by the presence of government power in the economy.  
There is significant literature on the effect of government-controlled 
firms that supports this view.
50
  Indeed, the most useful source of sup-
port for the public choice challenges faced by government-controlled 
companies is through the direct study of their efficiency.  Maxwell 
Stearns and Todd Zwyicki cite to a review of seventy-one academic 
studies of government-controlled firms, which shows that in fifty-six 
of those studies, state-owned firms consistently operated less efficient-
ly than their private counterparts.
51
  Professor Roberta Romano has 
also examined the costs of political participation in investment deci-
sions.
52
  The bailout, and the government’s controlling ownership, is 
nevertheless a fact of life that must be addressed.  As such, it is impor-
tant to understand not only that government ownership distorts mar-
ket outcomes, but also a fuller explanation of how that occurs.  This 
Article attempts to provide that understanding. 
In public choice literature, economic rents are typically defined 
as returns to owners of an asset above their opportunity cost.
53
  
Stearns and Zywicki explain that government-conferred rents are typ-
ically created through the erection of barriers to entry such that the 
entry of new competitors, which would otherwise result in the erosion 
of rents through competition, is stifled.
54
  For example, regulations 
that make it difficult for new competitors to enter a business will work 
to the advantage of existing firms in the industry.
55
  Deadweight losses 
are the initial cost of rent seeking, as outputs are constrained by the 
resulting changes in incentives for producers.
56
  Gordon Tullock also 
notes that there is an additional cost to politically conferred rents be-
 
 50 For a thorough discussion of the literature in this area, see J.W. Verret, Separa-
tion of Bank and State: The Bailout Meets Federal Budget Law, 2011 BYU L. REV. (forth-
coming 2011). 
 51 See MAXELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND 
APPLICATIONS IN LAW 349 (2009) (citing DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III 373 
(2003)). 
 52 See generally Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Gover-
nance Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795 (1993). 
 53 STEARNS & ZYWICKI , supra note 51, at 49. 
 54 Id. 
 55 See id. 
 56 See id. 
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cause industry will expend resources to obtain rents, which he de-
scribes as “rent dissipation.”
57
 
In considering the interest groups most likely to engage in rent 
seeking by encouraging the development of regulation, one of the 
foundational principles is that interest groups will be more or less ef-
fective in their pursuits depending on whether they suffer from col-
lective action constraints or whether the costs of staying informed ex-
ceed the potential benefits.
58
  Smaller, more organized groups thus 
obtain an advantage over larger, less compact ones.
59
  In this case, the 
retail shareholders in government-controlled firms are the least po-
werful under interest-group theory because they actually have strong 
and rational incentives to diversify their investment.  This keeps the 
group as a whole larger and less organized than the other interest 
groups with which the firm interacts.  In the exceptional case of insti-
tutional shareholders, like union or state pension funds, the share-
holder’s stake in a particular firm may be large enough that they 
could become a powerful interest group.  And yet, the presence of 
conflicted objectives for many of those shareholders could still work 
against diversified retail shareholders.  For example, union pension 
funds may also share the goals of employee interest groups interact-
ing with the government-controlled firm and may thereby actually be 
able to coordinate with one another to facilitate rent-seeking beha-
vior between the pension fund and the represented employees. 
In some ways the traditional public choice analysis of rent seek-
ing is complicated in the context of a previously private corporation 
that becomes subject to control by a government shareholder.  The 
literature has considered private firms seeking rents or economic 
benefits conferred not through additional marginal value of inputs 
but instead by enhancing their competitive position through regula-
tion.  Firms and interest groups would induce government regulators 
and legislators to pass regulations that allow firms to capture rents by 
sharing the value of those rents through lobbying expenses, employ-
ing regulators subsequent to their public employment, or other 
means.  In the context of government-controlled firms, both the ini-
tial stage of rent-seeking behavior and the second stage in which gov-
ernment uses its leverage to extract rents should be considered.  But 
 
 57 See Gordon Tullock, Efficient Rent Seeking, in TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-
SEEKING SOCIETY 97, 97–112 (James Buchanan et al., eds., 1980) [hereinafter Tullock, 
Efficient Rent Seeking]; Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and 
Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224, 226, 232 (1967). 
 58 STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 51, at 56. 
 59 See id. at 57. 
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this Article will argue that in the context of government-controlled 
firms, the method the government uses for rent extraction is fairly 
unique, as the government uses the firm as a mechanism to transfer 
rents to interest groups.
60
 
Fred McChesney presented a new spin on the rent-seeking dy-
namic when he argued that in addition to actual rent creation, gov-
ernment actors may have incentives to extract rents once they are 
created through threats to roll-back regulatory bargains.
61
  He devel-
ops a model in which elected officials can obtain returns by threaten-
ing to extract returns that are part of previous rent-seeking deals and 
then seeking forbearance from the regulation in a way that would 
eviscerate those rents.
62
 
In the context of government-controlled firms, the politician 
could extract rents by withdrawing some of the forbearance that firms 
receive and which benefit managers.
63
  Or, more simply, and more 
powerfully, the politician can threaten to use the government’s equity 
power to replace the board members and directors if the firm does 
not comply.
64
  With respect to withdrawing regulatory benefits, the 
politician would have an interest in not losing those rents that are 
passed through to interest groups, yet in a situation like TARP where 
the number of government-owned firms is significant, the political ac-
tor might make an example out of one firm in order to increase his 
rent-extraction ability at all the others.
65
 
McChesney also observes that politicians using rent-extraction 
methods to obtain private rents, rather than politically-conferred 
rents will not be limited by the value of their political bargain but in-
stead by the value of the private rents created by the firm itself.
66
  In 
this context, that observation may mean that governments will actual-
ly have a greater interest in maintaining their ownership of profitable 
firms than those that are struggling, although they may also have to 
keep the latter for lack of an alternative buyer. 
Another method the government could use to extract rents from 
government-owned banks, even if the intent is merely to hold the 
government’s investment for a short time, would be to threaten to in-
 
 60 See infra text accompanying notes 65–68. 
 61 Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of 
Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101, 102 (1987). 
 62 Id. at 102. 
 63 See id. at 103–05. 
 64 See id. 
 65 See id. at 109. 
 66 Id. at 107. 
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crease the minimum requirements needed for the bank to repay its 
government loan and exit the government’s ownership.  Regulators 
have a great deal of discretion to alter capital adequacy ratios, and 
can change these requirements by informal consultation rather than 
formal rulemaking, so such threats may not be readily made public.
67
 
The rent seeking then becomes part of a two-step process 
through the government corporation as an intermediary for rent 
seeking by interest groups and firms that interact with the govern-
ment-controlled corporation.  The government-controlled firms cap-
ture rents in the traditional way, through regulatory forbearance or 
through lobbying to get regulations passed that enhance their com-
petitive position, but then they use those rents to subsidize a transfer 
of wealth to the interest groups with whom they do business.
68
  They 
also obtain rents in a non-traditional way, through the benefits of an 
implied or express debt guarantee.  In effect, rather than investing 
directly in rent seeking by paying legislators and regulators, they pass 
the benefits of rent seeking directly to interest groups.  This pass-
through of rents works to the benefit of political actors because the 
interest groups that receive the transfers from the government-
controlled corporation are the same groups who provide support to 
the legislators.  The government-controlled firm then becomes effec-
tively a rent-transfer agent.  As the rents are passed through the gov-
ernment-controlled firm, they can take a variety of forms.  To con-
sumers it can involve a price subsidy, to employees it can take the 
form of a wage subsidy.  As the government’s accounting rules do not 
require it to consolidate the liabilities of those firms or to recognize 
the cost of implicit guarantees on the government’s books, there is 
little cost to the politician, particularly in the short-term.
69
 
McChesney argues that politicians can extract not only political-
ly-conferred rents, which go beyond being mere transfers and can ac-
tually inhibit incentives to innovate, but also privately developed rents 
that incentivize private innovation and development.
70
  In this con-
text, that second-order problem would depend on whether the subsi-
dies provided to interest groups by the government-controlled firm 
were funded more by the political rents obtained by the firm or by 
the private rents held by the firm.
71
  If the issue was solely one of ex-
traction of private rents, rather than political rents, then there might 
 
 67 See infra notes 81–84 and accompanying text. 
 68 Id. 
 69 See Verret, Separation of Bank and State, supra note 50. 
 70 McChesney, supra note 61, at 103. 
 71 See id. 
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be some benefit to forcing the government-controlled company to 
transfer those rents, if it was assumed that such a dynamic would 
quickly lead to insolvency.  It would limit the incentives of companies 
to accept and rely on government bailout, and thus limit some of the 
moral-hazard concerns present in bailout dynamics.  Since it would 
be impossible to assure the politically conferred rents were not also 
accruing to the firm, particularly since the government’s guarantee is 
often implicit, it would still, however, present the concern of off-
budget transfers through guaranty spending as well as distortions of 
the private securities markets, particularly if the government-
controlled firm is able to remain, or appear to remain, solvent for a 
long period of time, as was the case with Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac.  Further, in practice, private and political rents are not likely to 
be segregated or easily identified but are instead pooled together 
within the assets of the government-controlled firm. 
Since government-controlled firms obtain regulatory benefits as 
part of their rents, and some of those regulations are designed to lim-
it principal-agency conflicts of executives, one might expect execu-
tives to obtain private rents as part of the bargain.  Additionally, one 
might expect competition for rents to occur since rents are trans-
ferred through government-controlled entities and the mangers of 
entities serving in this capacity obtain some private benefit—for ex-
ample, the regulatory preferences that attend government ownership 
also could hide their own tunneling of firm assets through executive 
compensation or other means.
72
  Three distinct layers of Tullock’s 
rent dissipation could develop, if not more.
73
  The government-owned 
firms might compete for more rents, and the executive’s will compete 
for their share of rents, then interest groups will compete for their 
share of the transfer of rents passed through the firm. 
If the benefit obtained by government-owned firms that is then 
directed to interest groups is merely funded by the government’s 
guarantee, then the dynamic resembles deficit spending.  If, however, 
the benefits transferred are funded by political rents given to the 
government-controlled firm through regulation or regulatory for-
bearance, then classical analysis of rent seeking applies.  McChesney’s 
model of rent extraction also offers a unique explanation if the bene-
fits transferred come from private or political rents held by the gov-
ernment-controlled firms.  The particular mix of rents and subsidies 
supporting transfers through the government-controlled entity will 
 
 72 See Tullock, Efficient Rent Seeking, supra note 57, 97–112. 
 73 For an explanation of the process of rent dissipation, see STEARNS & ZYWICKI, 
supra note 51, at 59. 
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depend on the nature of the firm and the particular attributes of its 
competitive position within its industry. 
McChesney notes that the method of obtaining rents from gov-
ernment actors can include bribes but can just as easily be obtained 
through contributions of in-kind service or property.
74
  One method 
for government officials to obtain benefits from rent seekers is simply 
campaign contributions.
75
  The method of indirect benefits through 
directed transfers, occurring off-budget to interest groups who sup-
port the politician, is actually less costly to the political actor since he 
would not have to report the contribution and is unlimited on the 
contributions he is able to obtain. 
Rent dissipation for government-controlled firms could come in 
the form of firms bidding up the price discount they are willing to 
give consumers—for example, discounts on loans for consumers at 
particular income levels or in particular regions that can correlate to 
benefits for political actors.  This could involve transfers on behalf of 
the political actor in exchange for the rents they seek as a firm, such 
as regulatory forbearance or an increase in the government’s explicit 
(or, for that matter, implicit) guarantee that its competitors do not 
share.  But the act of transferring that rent itself actually increases the 
risk that the government eventually will need to make good on its 
implicit guarantee.  The rents flowing from an implicit guarantee 
that government-controlled firms obtain can be exacerbated by the 
fact that the firms themselves can control the size of the subsidy by 
controlling the amount of debt that they decide to issue.
76
 
The notion of government using a controlled corporation as a 
mechanism for off-budget transfers is actually a method of indirect 
rent seeking.  The rents subsidize the transfer, or at least keep the 
transfer vehicle afloat long enough for the legislator or regulator to 
maximize his or her share of the rent extraction.  What results is a 
sort of triangulated rent extraction.  Some have argued that rents 
created through the typical process are capitalized into the value of 
shares, but that may no longer be the case for government-controlled 
entities if politically conferred rents are instead transferred entirely 
through the firm and shareholders have to depend entirely on excess 
 
 74 McChesney, supra note 61, at 103. 
 75 John R. Lott, Jr., A Simple Explanation for Why Campaign Expenditures Are Increas-
ing: The Government Is Getting Bigger, 43 J.L. & ECON. 359, 363 (2000). 
 76 See David Reiss, The Federal Government’s Implied Guarantee of Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac’s Obligations: Uncle Sam Will Pick Up the Tab, 42 GA. L. REV. 1019, 1049 
(2008). 
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returns from private rents.
77
  In the case of Fannie and Freddie, some 
have argued that rents were shared between consumers, equity hold-
ers, and debt holders, 
78
 though calculating the exact value of rents 
obtained is tricky since Fannie and Freddie had no competitors. 
Stearns and Zywicki also explain that on the production frontier, 
firms can be thought of as facing a trade-off based on the relative re-
lationship between the returns they can earn from rent seeking 
against the returns they can earn from the next available investment 
activity.
79
  If that is true, TARP recipients may decide to pay back their 
government loans and exit the TARP regulatory regime on that basis.  
As such, we might expect to see an Akerlof lemons problem come in-
to play for purchasers of the government’s securities in the private 
markets, which would itself inform the price a firm would be willing 
to pay the government.
80
  Because potential buyers of the government 
securities would be at an informational disadvantage given the prefe-
rential treatment that government-owned firms receive in disclosure 
rules, the investors would assume that all sales of securities by the 
government were “lemons” and would discount them accordingly. 
Another advantage of the government using corporations as 
transfer agents is that the government will enjoy the ability to camouf-
lage the rent-seeking activity from public view through the use of an 
intermediary.
81
  This advantage may arise because the government is 
able to keep the firm off of the government’s financial statements, 
the national debt, and the federal budget.
82
  The advantage may also 
result from the bailed-out entity’s ability to pool its politically ob-
tained rents with its other assets, thus making it difficult to track the 
payoffs from political actor to interest group. 
Some have argued that the central reason why the federal gov-
ernment creates corporations is solely to take activities off budget 
while allowing the government to continue to subsidize interest 
groups by collecting rents.
83
  As such, the government’s new share of 
ownership through the bailout should present a tempting target for 
political actors.  Countervailing forces may deter the government 
 
 77 See McChesney, supra note 61, at 105. 
 78 Froomkin, supra note 6, at 600. 
 79 STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 51, at 62. 
 80 George A. Akerlof, The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Me-
chanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488, 489 (1970). 
 81 See Froomkin, supra note 6, at 599. 
 82 For further analysis of this issue, see Verret, Separation of Bank and State, supra 
note 50. 
 83 Froomkin, supra note 6, at 596. 
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from running bailed-out firms into the ground.  But at the very least, 
the government’s involvement could be expected to skim off value, 
both for the companies and for the government’s investment.  For in-
stance, merely because the government, as of this writing, appears to 
be able to sell off its interest in some of the larger TARP recipients at 
a small profit does not mean that the government did not extract sig-
nificant value over the term of its investment through rent transfers.
84
 
There are other forces which will complicate this dynamic.  For 
instance, equity markets—markets for a firm’s factors of production 
(suppliers) and the firm’s consumers—should all be expected to take 
into account the costs of rent seeking and rent transfers in determin-
ing whether to do business with the government-controlled firm and 
at what price.  But the presence of a government implicit guarantee, 
combined with the fact that government-controlled firms obtain reg-
ulatory benefits which limit disclosure rules which apply to other non-
government-controlled firms, complicates the operation of market 
discipline in this area.  Another aspect to this dynamic may be that 
the question of whether a government will bail out a government-
controlled firm and to what extent (whether to make creditors partly 
whole or entirely whole, or make equity holders partly whole or en-
tirely whole) could present the a tail-end risk that some commenta-
tors are arguing cannot be properly modeled by market partici-
pants.
85
 
One area of public choice theory that will not be particularly ap-
plicable in this context is the role of the judiciary in public choice.  
The government’s activities as owner of TARP firms are protected by 
particularly strong sovereign immunity provisions, including those in 
the TARP legislation itself.
86
  As such, William Landes and Richard 
Posner’s analysis of the role of the independent judiciary as enforcer 
of rent-seeking bargains is also muted.
87
  However, the government’s 
ability to actually replace the directors of TARP firms would mean 
that the courts’ role as enforcer of rent-seeking bargains would be-
come largely irrelevant anyway. 
 
 84 See Deborah Solomon, Bailout Looking Much Less Pricey, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 
2010, at C1.  A recent news story reports the Treasury’s assertions that it will be able 
to sell off its interest in Citigroup and GM through a public offering in 2010.  Id. 
 85 See generally NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE 
HIGHLY IMPROBABLE (2007) (discussing surprise risk events and their disruption of 
market expectations). 
 86 See Verret, Treasury Inc., supra note 4, at 307. 
 87 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Inter-
est Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875 passim (1975). 
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This section has considered how the government can use its le-
verage over government-controlled firms to facilitate rent transfers.  
It shows how traditional rent-seeking models from existing public 
choice literature provide a useful lens to understand the process in 
this context, but it also considers dynamics unique to the govern-
ment-controlled corporation context such as the notion of rent trans-
fers.  But one may ask why the government could not use regulatory 
leverage and liquidity guarantee over all firms to do the same thing 
with equal ability.  The answer, and what makes government-
controlled firms a unique animal in these contexts, is that the gov-
ernment can replace the board of directors and the managers of the 
companies it controls.  As such, it has a bonding mechanism to en-
sure that the government-controlled company stands by its end of the 
bargain.  This mechanism gives the government the power to poten-
tially encourage rent extraction of privately conferred rents in the 
ways that McChesney suggests but to a much greater degree.
88
  In-
deed, the government could go beyond mere rent extraction and ex-
tract actual value from the corporation, depending on its leverage 
versus that of the company’s executives.  The power to replace the 
executives and the board limits the company’s freedom to push back 
against the government’s demands. 
To the extent that the rent enjoyed by the government-
controlled firm is forbearance from monopoly regulation, that rent 
also has the secondary consequence of constraining product market 
constraints that would otherwise serve as a check on agency costs.
89
  In 
many cases, capital markets would have the ability to still serve as a 
powerful constraint even on monopoly firms.
90
  But in this case, be-
cause one of the rents that firms enjoy is a government guarantee, 
that constraint is limited.  Mark Roe also argues that more monopoly 
power results in higher managerial agency costs as managers and 
employees engage in competition for the rents.
91
 
The final dimension of rent seeking, the competition of differ-
ent groups for existing rents, may be the most difficult to predict in 
this context.  The process whereby rents are shared with workers and 
other constituencies in firms that are not directly controlled by the 
government has been somewhat of a black box.  Roe notes that wages 
for unionized industries subject to monopoly power were shared with 
 
 88 See supra notes 66–71 and accompanying text. 
 89 Mark J. Roe, Rents and Their Corporate Consequences, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1463, 1468–
69 (2001). 
 90 Id. at 1468. 
 91 Id. at 1472. 
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union workers in the form of higher wages than similar workers in 
other areas of the economy.
92
  One study examined the effect of inter-
state banking deregulation on wages to determine how the firms, who 
through state restrictions on bank entry enjoyed rents, shared those 
rents with employees as compared to employee salaries after the rents 
were taken away.
93
  The study found that regulatory barriers permit-
ted firms to share rents with employees through higher wages.
94
 
The relative share of rents enjoyed by regulators and politicians, 
managers, workers, consumers, and other constituents of the gov-
ernment-controlled firm will depend on the relative leverage they are 
able to exercise.  For instance, during Franklin Raines’ tenure at 
Fannie Mae, he was able to exert significant leverage over members 
of Congress.
95
  Under his watch the firms coordinated political inter-
est group pressures, keeping detailed records of the level of mortgag-
es they subsidized by congressional district.
96
  But after the scandals of 
2004 broke, Raines was quickly forced out and the firm’s clout dimi-
nished considerably.
97
 
Thus it may be difficult to predict just how the firms’ rents will 
be shared as it will be the result of a dynamic negotiation.  The power 
relationships between the various groups seeking to share in rents, 
and the alliances that those groups form with legislators and bureau-
crats, should shift with the tides of political outcomes.  For example, 
one of the reasons Fannie Mae has maintained such a powerful pres-
ence is through its alliance with other interest groups that profit from 
Fannie Mae’s presence, including mortgage brokers, realtors, and 
other Wall Street investment banks, that may otherwise be unlikely 
members of an interest group coalition that includes community ac-
tivists.
98
  These allies were loyal to Fannie Mae because Fannie Mae 
had a reputation for ending relationships with groups or businesses 
that did not support its interests or criticized it, including its notable 
decision to cancel ads in magazines like The Economist that ran critical 
editorials.
99
 
 
 92 Id. at 1467.  
 93 Sandra E. Black & Philip E. Strahan, The Division of Spoils: Rent-Sharing and Dis-
crimination in a Regulated Industry, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 814, 814–16 (2001). 
 94 Id. 
 95 See JONATHAN G.S. KOPPELL, THE POLITICS OF QUASI-GOVERNMENT, HYBRID 
ORGANIZATIONS AND THE DYNAMICS OF BUREAUCRATIC CONTROL 99, 101 (2003). 
 96 See id. at 99. 
 97 See id. at 118. 
 98 Id. at 112. 
 99 Id. at 100. 
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The relationship between the government-controlled firm’s 
managers and the government and interest groups will also shift in 
relation to events that invite public scrutiny.  It will also depend in 
large part on the firm’s ability to maintain and capitalize on informa-
tion asymmetries and unverifiable information to generate an ap-
pearance of interest-group transfers that are higher than the actual 
rents transferred.
100
  Information asymmetries can also run against the 
political actors.  For instance, a government-controlled firm may be 
able to convince an interest group or a political actor that it is sharing 
more rents than is actually the case.  The relationship will further de-
pend on the firm’s ability to mask the costs of the implicit guarantee, 
which is aided by difficulty in measuring those costs.
101
  Finally, it will 
depend on a firm’s ability to maintain normal profits and to mask fi-
nancial strains in order to delay a need to make use of the govern-
ment’s guaranty at which time the government may feel compelled, 
as it did in 2008, to replace management as a necessary condition of 
making good on its implicit guarantee. 
Now that rent seeking has been analyzed, including concepts 
such as rent extraction, rent dissipation, rent sharing, this Article’s 
contribution to the literature of rent transfer theory, and the incen-
tives facing political actors in all of these concepts, the second step is 
to consider the incentives of bureaucratic actors that are in some ways 
insulated from the political process but still remain coordinating 
agents of those political actors. 
B. Bureaucratic Incentives in Government-Controlled Companies 
While rent-seeking objectives guide the decisions of political ac-
tors, an alternative but related literature has developed to consider 
the set of incentives that guides bureaucratic actors.  In part, this is 
because most bureaucratic actors are intentionally protected from 
political pressure by civil service laws.
102
  Another unique characteris-
tic of bureaucratic actors is that their compensation is typically based 
on seniority and not on the performance of the bureaucrat or the 
performance of the bureau.
103
  And yet, the rent-seeking dynamics al-
so seem to seep into bureaucratic decision making through indirect 
 
 100 Id. at 131.   
 101 KOPPELL, supra note 95, at 128. 
 102 See STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 51, at 340 (citing Herbert Kaufman, Major 
Players: Bureaucracies in American Government, 61 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 18, 20–21 (2001)), 
for an estimate that the Civil Service Act protects roughly 90% of non-defense gov-
ernment employees. 
 103 See id. at 341. 
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means, particularly congressional oversight and budgeting of the bu-
reau.  This section will examine the incentives of bureaucratic actors 
and explore whether the level of incentives can be melded with the 
interest-group rent seeking facilitated by political actors in the pre-
vious section.  This analysis will also add a useful framework for con-
sidering the government’s management of its shareholder interests. 
To the extent that the chartering agencies, like the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the FDIC, who can only be 
removed for cause, retain significant power over TARP recipients as 
regulators, their willingness to coordinate with political actors is an 
important consideration.  The Treasury’s Assistant Secretary for Fi-
nancial Stability, a political appointee, is the lead coordinator for the 
government’s investment in bailout recipients and reports to the Sec-
retary of the Treasury and serves at the pleasure of the President.  It is 
particularly relevant that current Assistant Secretary for Financial 
Stability Herb Allison was most recently the CEO of Fannie Mae, 
104
 
the one government-controlled firm that most acutely highlights the 
rent transfer problem.  As such, rent seeking and bureaucratic incen-
tives will blend together when considering the full set of incentives of 
all the government elements bearing on this question.  The Assistant 
Secretary for Financial Stability is also likely to be supported by a 
large staff of civil service employees, thus reinforcing the need to 
combine views of political appointees and civil servants. 
One central theory to explain the motivations of bureaucratic 
actors is the agency expansion hypothesis.  This view, originating with 
William Niskanen, argues that the utility function of bureaucratic ac-
tors is likely to be largely influenced by a desire to increase variables 
like power, patronage, agency size, prerequisites, and salary.
105
  Niska-
nen’s model predicts that agency officials will seek to maximize their 
budgets and their jurisdiction to achieve this goal.
106
  Niskanen’s se-
minal Bureaucracy and Representative Government helps explain the be-
havior of bureaus collectively.
107
  In order to see how bureaus act 
when pressured, Niskanen assumes that the “benefactor”—the gov-
ernment entity sponsoring the bureau—is not passive but actively en-
 
 104 U.S. Treasury, Herbert M. Allison, Jr.: Assistant Sec’y for Financial Stability and 
Counselor to the Sec’y, http://www.ustreas.gov/organization/bios/allison-e.html 
(last visited Aug. 2, 2010). 
 105 WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 38 
(1971). 
 106 STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 51, at 343. 
 107 NISKANEN, supra note 105. 
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gaged to the fullest extent possible in the affairs of the bureau.
108
  The 
assumption of a passive benefactor is only relevant when informa-
tional boundaries make it hard for the benefactor to evaluate the bu-
reau (an assumption that depends upon the extent to which the gov-
ernment-controlled firm can hide information from the agency 
exercising control).
109
  Niskanen nevertheless disagrees with the clas-
sic assumption that officers within a bureau are entirely self-
interested.
110
  Indeed, he expects officers to work hard and to have a 
mixed calculus of objectives—some may focus more on personal 
goals than others, but officers are “neither philosopher-kings nor, in 
the modern terminology, Pareto-optimizers.”
111
  Another reason that 
the government often fails to efficiently allocate resources is that 
higher level bureaucrats have poor information on the true mini-
mum costs to supply a specific service.
112
  Niskanen argues that mo-
nopolistic providers of government services are much like monopol-
ists in the free market—they do not have a viable supply function.
113
  
This is especially acute on the federal level as municipalities can 
compare themselves to other similarly situated municipalities but 
federal bureaus have few peers.
114
 
All of this may partially explain the Treasury’s push to use the 
TARP to obtain controlling equity over businesses because this use 
would result in the Treasury obtaining power over the budgets of 
those entities as well.  The bureaucrats coordinate with political ac-
tors in rent extraction through the budget process, where legislative 
committees oversee and approve bureau budgets in exchange for the 
cooperation of bureaucrats.  Another incentive tempting bureaucrat-
ic actors is that they may obtain opportunities for lucrative post-
government employment because of their experience at the agency; 
therefore, they may design rules that increase the agency’s power and 
jurisdiction to maximize those opportunities.
115
  In this context, con-
sulting work for government-controlled firms, or for firms that may 
seek to do business with government-controlled firms, may present 
lucrative opportunities. 
 
 108 Id. at 127. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. at 128. 
 111 Id.   
 112 Id. at 136. 
 113 See NISKANEN, supra note 105, at 136. 
 114 See id. 
 115 See STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 51, at 346. 
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Cotton Lindsay’s work also runs contiguous to the Niskanen 
view.
116
  Lindsay notes that there are both supply side and demand 
side differences inherent in government enterprises.
117
  Although 
consumers continue to affect firm behavior through commercial rela-
tionships, Lindsay notes that they use the political process to affect 
the provision of goods as well.  He notes that consumers are likely to 
seek a different bundle and a greater degree of services through the 
exercise of political will than through market-based demand.
118
  Lind-
say notes that the distinguishing feature guiding bureaucrats in their 
production decisions is the desire to please Congress, and in doing so 
they will divert resources from the production of attributes not ob-
served or targeted by Congress.
119
  As such, the bureaucrat manager 
will have an interest in increasing Congress’s perception that the bu-
reau is important.  We have already explored the possibility that the 
government-controlled firm may find ways to use informational dis-
advantages to generate for the political actors the appearance of in-
terest group transfers that exceed actual transfers.  But the same dy-
namic may also come into play as the executive bureaucrats 
overseeing the government’s investment interact with members of 
Congress or the President.  To the extent that executives at govern-
ment-controlled firms or bureaucrats mislead about the extent to 
which rents are transferred and that misperception benefits the fi-
nancial health of the government-controlled enterprise, then the 
surprisingly long periods of time before a government-controlled en-
terprise becomes insolvent may be more readily appreciated. 
Lindsay’s “Theory of Government Enterprise” paints a bleak fu-
ture for the prospect that the government can effectively supply 
goods that can otherwise be supplied in the marketplace.
120
  Within 
the first three sentences, Lindsay states that “the typical customer of a 
government bureau expects inconvenience and delay in receipt of 
service.”
121
  But Lindsay also asserts that until 1976, economists had 
not created a model analogous to the profit maximizing model of 
private firms, which could judge government action.
122
 
 
 116 See Cotton M. Lindsay, A Theory of Government Enterprise, 84 J. POL. ECON. 1061 
(1976). 
 117 Id. at 1062.  
 118 Id. at 1062. 
 119 Id. at 1065. 
 120 See id. 
 121 Id. at 1061. 
 122 Lindsay, supra note 116, at 1062. 
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In Lindsay’s view, the typical consumer of government services 
can influence the government in two distinct ways: (1) as a normal 
consumer, demanding services as with any other business, and (2) 
through political channels.
123
  The second type of influence com-
mands Lindsay’s focus in his article. 
Lindsay asserts that political forces exerted on government bu-
reaus can affect behavior in two ways: (1) collectively, a group may 
demand a different bundle than its members would as individual 
consumers and (2) because government agencies are judged by fac-
tors beyond profitability, bureaucrats act differently than they would 
within a free-market organization.
124
  In sum, there are distinct de-
mand-side influences (the product demanded, either from individu-
als or special interest groups) and supply-side influences (criteria 
other than profitability that the bureau must meet).
125
 
Until the publication of Lindsay’s work, many theorists operated 
from the simple assumption that bureaus acted in a way that would 
maximize their budget.
126
  While this theory was rational, it did not 
fully explain their behavior or how they managed to maximize their 
budget.
127
  Explaining the situation aptly, Lindsay writes that “[t]o say 
that bureaucrats have a taste for bureaus, therefore, tells us no more 
about their behavior as managers than does the assertion of any other 
taste.”
128
  In addition, budgets are largely set by Congress and are ex-
ogenous from the bureaus themselves.
129
  Instead, they must please 
their congressional benefactors, who in turn are interested in pleas-
ing their constituents.
130
  In this context, the Assistant Secretary for 
Financial Stability may not have as keen an interest in maximizing the 
bureau’s budget because the resources he controls exist on the pri-
vate budgets of the government-controlled firms.  He will, however, 
coordinate his activity with the Treasury’s interest in budget maximi-
zation, which itself will be muted by the variety of other factors in-
fluencing the bureaucratic actor. 
If the size of a bureau budget is to be interpreted as the sole me-
tric of productivity, then Congress must interpret budget size as an 
 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. 
 126 See id. at 1063. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Lindsay, supra note 116, at 1063. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. 
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indication of output.
131
  Lindsay argues that severe informational con-
straints must be in place if this is to be the result.
132
  Even in the bu-
reau setting, having an effective manager is important.  But determin-
ing effectiveness in the bureaucratic setting is tricky.  In ordinary 
profit-maximizing organizations, financial statements allow one to 
judge the effectiveness of a manager.
133
  Although not the only factor, 
financial statements provide an indication of effectiveness.
134
  A bad 
manager at a firm will have higher input costs, lower overall output, 
or both.
135
  Any combination of these factors would most likely result 
in lessened earnings.
136
 
But in the bureau setting, many times the bureau is charged with 
producing a good that would not be supplied at market prices.
137
  For 
example, the bureau charged with providing medical care to the dis-
advantaged could not charge market prices because, by definition, 
that bureau’s customers are unable to pay for the services they 
need.
138
  For these bureaus, the true measure of productivity is the 
importance that the political process puts on bureau output.
139
  Fur-
ther, the earnings of the government-controlled firms in this context 
will not be a useful measure for legislative overseers because they are 
more interested in how the firm transfers benefit to interest groups. 
Legislators have to estimate the output, directly, by whatever 
attributes it judges to be both important and capable of being moni-
tored.
140
  Because Congress cannot judge intangible or immeasurable 
factors, both Congress and the bureau will focus on those factors that 
are measurable.
141
  Another factor in the behavior of bureaus is the 
effect of a change in demand.
142
  With a profit-maximizing firm, out-
put changes to reflect demand.  With a bureau, this factor is largely 
absent because the government sets the price of the good supplied at 
zero, with the only indication of changes in demand coming from 
 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. at 1064. 
 134 Lindsay, supra note 116, at 1064. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id.  
 138 Id. at 1064.  
 139 Id. 
 140 Lindsay, supra note 116, at 1065. 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. 
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changes in Congressional demand.
143
  Accordingly, Lindsay predicts 
that bureaus will move toward congressionally measurable attributes 
over time.
144
 
Lindsay expects that chasing measurable outputs will lead to 
non-optimal results.  For example, a policeman whose output is 
judged on the number of general summonses issued will overly patrol 
roads that allow him to conceal his vehicle because the policeman 
can issue more summonses when he cannot be spotted.
145
 
Lindsay’s view offers a more refined lens for our purposes than 
the Niskanen view.  It may help to explain the different effects that 
rent transfer may have on different firms.  Although the metric by 
which interest groups and members of Congress can judge how much 
benefit they obtain from the rent transfer activity is not readily ap-
parent, it will in part be framed by the government-controlled firm 
and the bureaucrats charged with direct responsibility for it.  Thus it 
may be the case that the tradeoff between profits and transfer is sub-
ject to various indifference curves for the political actors depending 
on their perceptions of benefits obtained, which will be influenced by 
reports from the bureaucrats overseeing government-controlled firms 
and in part, by tradeoffs between the cost of the implied guaranty.  
Therefore, the cost to firm profits from rent transfer might be hete-
rogeneous depending on the firm.  For firms like Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac that serve as clearinghouses for mortgages, the output is 
more readily measurable in mortgage rates and so the cost to firm 
profits from the rent transfer is higher.  But for other government-
owned firms, outputs like small business lending volume or minority 
business loan volumes may have a lower cost proportionate to their 
perceived benefit for political actors.  Bureaucrats may be able to fo-
cus political actors on different trade-offs and reduce the cost of the 
rent transfer.  This dynamic may explain why some government-
controlled firms are able to limit the cost of rent transfers to their 
profits. 
An alternative view to Niskanen and Lindsay’s theories of bu-
reaucratic behavior is expressed by James Wilson, who posits that a 
prime focus for agencies is minimizing their conflict with other agen-
cies and their risk of failure.
146
  And yet, particularly with regard to 
banking regulation, regulatory competition is an inherent part of the 
 
 143 Id. at 1065–66. 
 144 Id. at 1066.  The inverse is also true, i.e., that “government agencies will devote 
no resources to the production of invisible output.”  Id. 
 145 Id. at 1066–67. 
 146 See STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 51, at 346–47. 
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landscape because the Comptroller, the Treasury, the FDIC, and the 
Federal Reserve all have overlapping jurisdiction in the regulation of 
banks.
147
  The OCC regulates the charter for federally chartered 
banks, and though the Comptroller, as head of the OCC, is a Trea-
sury official, he remains independent from the Secretary of the Trea-
sury (much like the FBI Director’s relationship with the Justice De-
partment and the Attorney General) and may be removed by the 
President only with cause during his five-year term of office.
148
  Be-
cause of this, the Treasury’s decision to take controlling equity stakes 
in banks may be viewed as a way to enhance its competitive position 
in relation to its competitor regulators. 
Wilson argues that the risk-averse agency will seek to avoid scan-
dals that might align the public and government against them be-
cause those agencies require strong public support to engage in ex-
pansive empire building.
149
  The scandal in this context would be that 
the government-controlled enterprise becomes insolvent.  But in the 
event of such insolvency, even risk-averse agency officials may be con-
fident in their abilities to outlast that occurrence, precisely because 
they are able to expand information asymmetries through forbear-
ance of regulatory disclosure and capital requirements by the Trea-
sury and other agencies.  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s exemption 
from SEC filings is a prime example.
150
  This would extend the time 
period under which the government-controlled entity could continue 
to operate before the eruption of scandal.  The bailed-out entities 
were considered failures when the government took them over,
151
 so 
the fact that the government failed to turn them around may be less 
of a scandal than the insolvency of an entity that started off solvent, as 
in the case of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 
 
 147 Howell E. Jackson, A Pragmatic Approach to the Phased Consolidation of Financial 
Regulation in the United States (Harvard Law Sch. Pub. L., Working Paper No. 09-19, 
2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1300431. 
 148 See 12 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) (“The Comptroller of the Currency shall be appointed 
by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and shall hold his 
office for a term of five years unless sooner removed by the President, upon reasons 
to be communicated by him to the Senate.”).  
 149 STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 51, at 348. 
 150 See generally Peter Wallison, Regulating Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, AM. ENTER. 
INST. FOR PUB. POLICY RESEARCH, May 2005, available at 
http://www.aei.org/docLib/20050513_FSOMay_g.pdf (discussing the possibility of 
Congressional regulation in light of Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s growing portfo-
lios).  
 151 See, e.g., Karnitschnig et al., supra note 12.  
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Some models of bureaucratic action focus on congressional con-
trol as the most powerful driving force behind bureaucratic actors.
152
  
This partially explains the willingness of other regulatory agencies, 
like the SEC, to provide regulatory forbearance to government-
controlled companies in the form of reduced transparency rules and 
reduced enforcement for regulatory violations to assist the agencies, 
like the Treasury, in stewarding government control of companies.  
The SEC would be doing so at the behest of congressional commit-
tees, which have an interest in maintaining the viability of those firms. 
Stearns and Zywicki note an interesting anecdote from John Alli-
son, chairman of BB&T Corporation, which considers how bureau-
cratic incentives and political actors can contradict.
153
  In the midst of 
the financial crisis, the executive branch wanted to encourage banks 
to make more loans, but frontline bank examiners had precisely the 
opposite incentive—to minimize the risk that loans in portfolios at 
banks they oversaw would default.
154
  If those incentives remain in 
force, the balance of power has been distinctly shifted from the bank-
ing examiners at the FDIC, the Federal Reserve, and the OCC to po-
litical actors and bureaucrats within the Treasury Department and 
the Office of Financial Stability through the government’s holding. 
One way that government overseers may be able to appease in-
terest groups and reduce bank risk would be to encourage govern-
ment-controlled banks to buy more Treasury bonds to help fund def-
icit spending by the administration.  In effect, the government-
controlled firm could become a mechanism for transferring rents 
through the entity and back to the government.  The rents produced 
could be used to finance deficit spending if the government con-
trolled firms artificially increase their appetite for Treasury bonds.  
The Federal Reserve has begun to push banks to reduce their risk.  
For instance, on October 22, 2009, the Federal Reserve released a 
discussion draft on compensation that linked its review of executive 
compensation, including performance based bonuses and golden pa-
rachutes, to risk.
155
  The proposal included two supervisory initiatives, 
 
 152 See STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 51, at 350 (citing Gary J. Miller & Terry M. 
Moe, Bureaucrats, Legislators, and the Size of Government, 77 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 297, 297 
(1983)); Barry Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Con-
trol? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765, 767 
(1983). 
 153 STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 51, at 360. 
 154 See id. 
 155 James Morphy, Fed Proposes Incentive Compensation Policies for Banking Organiza-
tions, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Nov. 3, 2009, 10:22 AM), 
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the first of which applied to the twenty-eight largest complex banking 
organizations and the second of which applied to all other Federal 
Reserve regulated banks.
156
  The proposal indicated that compliance 
with its provisions would be included in the bank’s supervisory ratings 
by the Federal Reserve.
157
  The proposal is notable for the lack of a 
consistent definition of excessive risk; indeed, it seems to explicitly 
authorize hindsight bias as a regulatory approach.  It does, however, 
provide some measure of guidance as to how banks should determine 
risky compensation policies and the general strategy that banks 
should take in matching risk to returns. 
To the extent that banks attempting to comply with these risk-
based assessments find overwhelming uncertainty in determining 
which assets and investing strategies are excessively risky, purchasing 
Treasuries would seem to be a safe choice to invest the bank’s portfo-
lio rather than purchasing more risky assets.  If the Treasury’s capital 
ownership in banks offers additional leverage over existing regula-
tion, then one might anticipate that it would be used to encourage 
private bankers to buy Treasury bonds rather than invest in other as-
sets.  This would stimulate artificial demand for Treasuries and keep 
interest rates on Treasury debt artificially low.  As such, artificial de-
mand for Treasuries would forestall politically unpopular deficit cuts 
or tax increases.  The government-controlled firm’s political rents 
could be a source of financing for its increased purchases of govern-
ment obligations. 
As one explanation for why bureaucrats may seek to maximize 
the value of their agency’s budget despite not sharing in those funds 
directly, Stearns and Zywicki note that employees may work at the 
agency out of an attraction to the agency’s mission and a desire to 
expand the reach of its authority that offers non-monetary utility.
158
  
For example, Treasury employees and other regulators of govern-
ment firms may feel that facilitating rent seeking at those firms will 
increase the chances that they will be able to repay the taxpayer’s in-
vestment.  This may be true despite potential harm to other firms and 
the fact that the rents may eventually be transferred in full to interest 
groups in the end, thereby ultimately threatening the value of the 
taxpayer’s investment.  Alternatively, they may feel a desire to facili-
 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2009/11/03/fed-proposes-incentive-
compensation-policies-for-banking-organizations/.  
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. 
 158 STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 51, at 364. 
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tate off-budget transfers, focusing only on the benefits transferred 
without considering their costs. 
A few additional and unique observations charge the incentives 
of government as shareholder.  First, the rents that interest groups 
enjoy and share with political actors and bureaucrats managing the 
Treasury’s investment are experienced immediately, but the costs are 
time-discounted, particularly to the extent that the rent being trans-
ferred is an implicit guarantee of the firm’s debt.  This is supported 
in part by the difference between the life cycle of the typical Schedule 
C appointee like the Assistant Secretary for Financial Stability, which 
is roughly two years,
159
 and the typical lifespan of a government-
sponsored or government-controlled enterprise, which the limited 
sample of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac suggests can range to forty or 
fifty years before the firm becomes insolvent. 
Second, when interest groups encourage subsidizing activity, 
such as subsidized interest rates at TARP banks, those activities will 
become a net benefit to the individual bureaucrat managing the gov-
ernment’s investment.  This effect is seriously magnified by the issues 
discussed in Part II.
160
 
Third, an indirect cost of the rent-transfer properties of the gov-
ernment-controlled firm, although difficult to quantify, is that the 
culture and infrastructure of the firm will be built around that guar-
antee.  The institutional knowledge of the firm will be based around 
the existence of a government guarantee and in the service of the 
non-financial objectives that will typically come with government con-
trol and ownership.  This, in turn, may make later re-privatization dif-
ficult. 
A public choice model for government bank lending versus pri-
vate bank lending might be sketched as follows.  Consider two mar-
ginal variables: L, which equals the net present value from future 
losses on unpaid loans in a bank’s portfolio, and P, which is the net 
present value of expected aggregate future interest payments on 
those loans.  For a private bank, the decision metric is fairly simple: 
lend when the marginal loan’s value is described as L < P.  An execu-
tive whose compensation is tied to the bank’s profitability would look 
to that equation in directing corporate policy, and a shareholder in-
terest in maximizing the health of the bank would do the same.  This 
model would be complicated by executive compensation that was im-
 
 159 See generally DAVID E. LEWIS, THE POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS: 
POLITICAL CONTROL AND BUREAUCRATIC PERFORMANCE (2008) (examining presidential 
appointments and their influence on public policy). 
 160 See supra Part II.   
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properly linked to performance, but as government pay is in no way 
linked to performance, this concern is irrelevant for this comparison. 
The decision process for a government shareholder is compli-
cated by a number of marginal variables that are not included for ex-
ecutives, namely interest-group rents from groups affected by com-
pany policies who vote for members of Congress and administrations.  
Consider the following simple illustration of a few marginal variables: 
GB represents interest-group rents, the benefits interest groups ob-
tain from the corporation, such as subsidized lending; GB2 represents 
the political benefits to administering efficient government, which 
might in some way enhance the administration’s reelection prospects 
and result in higher opinion poll numbers or decreased deficits; GD1 
represents the probability of being in office when a government-
owned bank fails or significantly appreciates in value or other event 
in the representation below occurs; GD2 represents the share of polit-
ical reward/blame that political actors get for effects on the banks 
viability, or for other decisions, taking into account the fact that polit-
ical actors are able to share blame among the political appointees in 
their department, appointees in other financial regulatory agencies, 
their predecessors, and members of Congress; GD3 represents the 
share of rents to interest groups that are shared with political actors, 
such as political donations, political support, or jobs after retirement 
from government; GC1 represents the net present value of future ex-
penditures under subsequent bailouts due to inefficient lending; and 
GC2 represents the cost of exercising equity control over banks.  For 
government-controlled banks, the decision by an administrator over-
seeing the government’s investment, and the decision metric used by 
other political actors who might be able to use political leverage to 
influence that administrator’s decision, will be to lend when 
 
L + GC2 + [GC1 × GD2 × GD1]  <  P + [GB2 × GD2 × GD1] + [GB × GD3]. 
 
As the right side of the equation gets larger from the additional 
variables, then, all else remaining equal, a lower interest rate is re-
quired (a component of P) to make the right side of the equation ex-
ceed the left.  This will result in subsidized lending through a lower 
interest rate on loans.  This representation might also be considered 
in a dynamic way in the sense that subsidized interest rates are part of 
the rent extracted by interest groups and shared with the TARP ad-
ministrator and those overseeing the TARP administrator, thus the 
decrease in interest rates will also itself increase GB and GD1.  As gov-
ernment-controlling interest increases, increasing shares of owner-
ship decrease the cost of control.  To the extent that incentives are 
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distorted by increasing share ownership in banks, this is supported by 
previously explored evidence that increases in a government’s per-
centage ownership in a bank correlates with decreases in bank profit-
ability.
161
  This representation is compiled with a government-
controlled bank in mind, but a government-controlled automotive or 
insurance company would have its own version as well. 
Rents tend to come before costs for government officials be-
cause they may be gone before the costs are experienced, magnifying 
the importance of those rents to them.  Thus their discount rate 
would be much higher than would otherwise be the case, and their 
discount rate would be much higher than that of a taxpayer with per-
fect information about the problem.  This is evidenced by a compari-
son of the average tenure of financial regulators and congressional 
banking committee chairmen to the time it took government subsi-
dies of lending to blow up in the cases of India, Italy, and Fannie Mae 
explored in the author’s prior work.
162
  The typical assistant secretary 
at the Treasury or HUD serves for two to three years, but it took near-
ly thirty years for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to explode.  The fact 
that rents come before costs alters the net present value analysis, as 
the costs are time discounted at a high rate but the rents effectively 
are not, which pushes the decision toward excessive lending. 
Another indirect cost of the government guarantee accompany-
ing government ownership, which would be difficult to account for in 
this simplistic representation, is that the culture and infrastructure of 
the firm will be built around the guarantee.  The institutional know-
ledge of the firm will be based around the existence of a government 
guarantee and in the service of the nonfinancial objectives that will 
typically come with government control and ownership.
163
  This will 
make later re-privatization difficult, as the market may not have an in-
 
 161 See, e.g., Alexander Muravyev, Federal State Shareholdings in Russian Companies: 
Origin, Forms and Consequences For Enterprise Performance 25 (Bank of Finland Inst. for 
Economies in Transition, Discussion Paper No. 12, 2002), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1015707  (suggesting that each x% increase in govern-
ment ownership correlates with a result y% decrease in bank earnings).  
 162 Verret, Separation of Bank and State, supra note 50. 
 163 See id.  Some argued that the best way to deal with the moral hazard problems 
of guaranteeing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac debt was simply to increase regulation 
of the GSEs.  Peter Wallison, Moral Hazard on Steroids: The OFHEO Report Shows that 
Regulation Cannot Protect U.S. Taxpayers 2 (American Enterprise Institute for Public 
Policy Research, AEI Outlook Series, 2006), available at 
http://www.aei.org/outlook/24591.  And yet, as Chairman Greenspan observed at 
the time, increased regulation of an implicitly government guaranteed enterprise 
only enhances the market’s perception that the government is all the more willing to 
guarantee their debt.  Id.  
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terest in buying into a firm whose instincts have been dulled by pub-
lic-sector backing and control and who may not be able to survive on 
their own outside the nest.
164
  An additional incentive that bureau-
crats may face is an increase in their post-employment value at gov-
ernment-controlled firms.  Existing public choice literature already 
has considered the effect of incentives for bureaucrats to increase 
regulatory complexity to add to their own employment prospects sub-
sequent to their government career.
165
  This will still be in effect in 
their case, but even more powerful will be their incentive to enhance 
the government’s control over the captured firm to enhance their 
value to government-controlled firms for consulting purposes. 
C. The Power of Interest Groups in Public Choice Analysis 
One potential interest-group criticism of the Treasury’s TARP 
holdings amounts to a suggestion that labor, management, and gov-
ernment will collectively conspire against the interests of taxpayers 
and, at times, the interest of shareholders, as well as the long-term in-
terests of a firm’s constituents.
166
  A similar type of collaboration is 
evident in Roe’s interest-group theory on the development of finan-
cial regulation discouraging the intermediation of capital in the 
United States during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and so 
may be considered by way of analogy for the purposes of this Ar-
ticle.
167
  Otherwise profitable nationalized firms create rents that can 
 
 164 See Verret, Separation of Bank and State, supra note 50.  As a particularly egre-
gious example of how Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s operational risks were ignored 
by private markets due to the government’s backing, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
were forbidden from filing financial statements with the SEC starting in 2003 due to 
revelations of earnings manipulations and accounting fraud.  Wallison, supra note 
163, at 2.  And yet, during the years that investors had no access to filed financial 
statements, their demand for Fannie and Freddie debt continued unabated.  Id. 
 165 See supra Part III.B. 
 166 See generally Ellen M. Pint, Nationalization and Privatization: A Rational-Choice 
Perspective on Efficiency, 10 J. PUB. POL’Y 267, 268 (1990).  Rational choice theory 
stands for the proposition that small and well-organized groups will tend to gain 
benefits over larger and less homogenous groups in the political process.  Id.  For ex-
ample, one study indicates a negative correlation between labor productivity and re-
sidual government ownership in Russian privatized firms.  Alexander Muravyev, supra 
note 161, at 25.  This study found that a 10% increase in government ownership was 
associated with a 6.5% drop in labor productivity and a 1.2% drop in profitability.  Id. 
 167 See J.W. Verret, Economics Makes Strange Bedfellows: Hedge Funds, Pension Funds in 
an Era of Financial Re-Intermediation 10 U. PA. J. BUS. & EMP. L. 63, 65 (2007) for a 
summary of Roe’s theory.  Roe’s theory for how labor and management interest 
groups helped to determine the shape of American finance in the 20th Century is 
instructive.  The political process Roe describes is as follows: the source of laws that 
restrict the power of intermediaries comes from both public opinion and interest 
group power.  Id.  Where the general public has even a weak preference, that prefe-
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be redistributed by liberal and conservative governments alike, effec-
tively making even profitable firms merely break even once the rents 
are distributed.
168
  The difference in which ideology holds power, 
then, would be merely to which constituency the rents would be dis-
tributed. 
Though the United States has tended to historically avoid gov-
ernment ownership in most economic firms, many other global 
economies are characterized by extensive government ownership in 
firms.  At times these governments nationalize private industries, and 
at times they privatize nationalized industries, all of which offers an 
opportunity to consider the interest-group forces that shape a gov-
ernment’s conduct as holder of a residual stake in firms in practice.  
The consequences of a government agency holding voting equity in a 
private firm can be costly.  Constituent directors tend to gain power 
when governments have equity and debt leverage over private firms.  
Labor is the primary constituent of the corporation that seeks influ-
ence over the corporation, but local constituencies seeking to block 
cross-border flows of capital and services, consumer rights activists, 
 
rence cannot be outweighed by that of a smaller, more interested group.  See Arthur 
T. Denzau & Michael C. Munger, Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Inter-
ests Get Represented, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 89, 96–99 (1986).  The American public has 
always been suspicious of consolidated economic power.  See MARK J. ROE, STRONG 
MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 48 
(1994).  The flow of funds, though, is essential to economic stability.  Thus a choice 
was inevitable: either intense regulation of one consolidated entity, or fragmentation 
with light regulation.  See id. at 41.  The American government chose the latter.  See 
generally id.  These two forces are magnified by federalism, which serves to enhance 
the effects of fragmentation and path dependency, both of which make institutions 
evolve in response to political choices.  See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A 
Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 
163 (2000).  Institutions that might have served as powerful intermediaries, namely, 
mutual funds, pension funds, banks, and insurers, were all constrained by a series of 
political reactions and rulemaking that constrained their economic influence over 
firms through some version of the political model described in Roe’s thesis.  See, e.g., 
David Langer, Protector Becomes the Threat to Pensions, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Sept. 
14, 1992, at 15, available at http://www.davidlanger.com/article_c46.html (describ-
ing how United Steelworkers and the United Auto Workers were key lobbyists for 
ERISA).  The political interest group theory is that managers and labor join together 
to oppose the rise of institutional investor power.  ROE, supra at 42–45.  Management 
does not want an intermediary that can monitor its extraction of rents in the form of 
excessive compensation, and labor is convinced that intermediaries will squeeze the 
employment rolls to maximize investor returns.  Id.   
 168 See Pint, supra note 166, at 275.  For instance, Britain’s nationalized railway and 
coal industries were directed to simply “break even,” and otherwise control prices to 
minimize consumer costs.  Id.  An exception to this challenge would be nationaliza-
tion as liquidation, which would effectively re-privatize the firm through a wind up 
procedure before interest groups have an opportunity to capture control over the 
firm through the government.  See id. 
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and environmental activists also seek a role.  A significant element of 
tension between shareholder wealth maximization and constituent 
directors is inescapable.  Stephen Bainbridge observes that share-
holders as a group have far less power as political interest groups 
than do non-shareholder constituencies of the corporation.
169
 
Michael Jensen and William Meckling examined the related is-
sue of labor-managed firms, which they define as presupposing the 
existence of laws restricting the rights of residual equity owners in fa-
vor of transfers to labor groups.
170
  They characterize this system as a 
pure-rental system because although individuals are permitted to own 
property, they are forbidden from having distinct property rights.
171
  
Instead, workers share the risk and returns to output, using average 
return per worker as their metric of success.
172
  Firms are permitted to 
rent from workers, but otherwise workers hold residual claims on the 
outputs since those outputs are dependent on future work for which 
Jensen and Meckling assert there is no legal market.
173
  Armen Alc-
hian and Harold Demsetz argue that such a system is inefficient com-
pared to one with firm ownership of productive assets and residual 
shareholder claimants.
174
  Jensen and Meckling note the monitoring 
cost angle to rental of productive assets because the lessee has re-
duced incentive to maintain the asset and guard it from theft and mi-
suse, and if such behavior cannot be costlessly monitored, the cost of 
that monitoring will explain why firms are often the most cost effec-
tive owner/monitor of productive assets.
175
 
 
 169 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Go-
vernance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 559–61 (2003).  For a further summary of the share-
holder power debate in this context, see J.W. Verret, Pandora’s Ballot Box, or a Proxy 
with Moxie? Majority Voting, Corporate Ballot Access, and the Legend of Martin Lipton Re-
examined, 62 BUS. LAW. 1007, 1021–35 (2007). 
 170 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Rights and Production Functions: An 
Application to Labor-Managed Firms and Codetermination, 52 J. BUS. 469, 475 (1979). 
 171 Id. at 476–77. 
 172 Id. at 476. 
 173 Id. at 477. 
 174 Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Econom-
ic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 792–93 (1972). 
 175 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 170, at 480.  Jensen and Meckling close by ex-
plaining five distinct flaws with the labor managed firm.  Id. at 481.  First, firms must 
at some point acquire intangible assets which by their nature cannot be rented such 
as goodwill, and thus the limitation on firm ownership cannot hold.  Id.  Second, 
there are different horizons for employees’ claims on cash flows that cannot be com-
pensated without cost and could lead workers to select negative net present value 
projects that maximize their individual return.  Id.  Third, such firms could see 
common property problems with equal sharing of cash flows among employees.  Id.  
Fourth, because workers claims are contingent on their continued employment, 
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This Article is an investigation of government ownership in pri-
vate firms, and the attendant consequences for the legal constraints 
on state action that are intended to limit public choice problems.  As 
such, a look at employee-managed firms may seem to be a detour.  It 
becomes directly relevant, however, when it is considered that one of 
the strongest constituencies who will seek to influence the govern-
ment in its exercise of shareholder powers is the employee represent-
ative groups.  Indeed, the automotive sector in particular is characte-
rized by high union membership.  This could also apply equally to 
investment banking activities by bank sector TARP recipients, as in-
vestment banks in part finance consolidation activity that tends to 
lead to layoffs.  As such, this analysis is particularly relevant for this 
case.  Only by understanding the inefficiencies of employee self-
governance can the costs of their ability to influence their managers 
through the intermediary of government as shareholder be grasped. 
D. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: A Direct Example of Government-
Controlled Firms and Rent Transfer 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are unique organizations among 
publicly traded companies.  They were initially government entities 
and subsequently spun off to private investors, with the government 
retaining substantial charter powers but no shareholding.  As part of 
the 2008 response to the financial crisis, they were both taken under 
government conservatorship, and the government also took a con-
trolling equity position in both firms.  While Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac are examples of firms that this Article’s analysis will apply to 
going forward, they also provide instructive examples for how gov-
ernment-controlled firms operate based on their history prior to the 
bailout. 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were originally chartered by the 
federal government and spun off as government-sponsored enter-
prises.  As evidence of the fact that bailed-out companies can easily 
become captive institutions used by the government to facilitate sub-
sidy, Michael Froomkin observes that many federally chartered com-
panies were created for that express purpose.
176
  Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac are the most recent examples of government-controlled 
companies that became insolvent due to the political pressures of 
government ownership, but the Farm Credit System also experienced 
 
their ability to diversify capital investments is limited.  Id.  Finally, workers will not be 
expected to manage in a way that minimizes residual losses, but will otherwise arrive 
at decisions and control managers in ways predicted by public choice theory.  Id. 
 176 Froomkin, supra note 6, at 558–59. 
VERRET FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/16/2010  1:10 PM 
1556 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1521 
insolvency due to the rent transfers it was pressured to give.
177
  Many 
federally created corporations are characterized by mixed owner-
ship.
178
  Mixed ownership is an arrangement in which the government 
owns a significant stake in the company but many of the shares may 
be publicly traded, and the President of the United States frequently 
obtains the right to appoint directors whether or not the government 
actually owns shares.
179
  In such companies, private market prices re-
flect obligations as though the company’s debt is supported by an 
implicit government guarantee, despite the presence of express dis-
claimers from the government that this is not the case.
180
 
The cases of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are therefore instruc-
tive.  Although they were not owned by the government until the 
government took them under conservatorship in 2008, the control 
the government exercised over these firms prior to the bailout de-
monstrates how the government will use its controlling equity powers 
in bailed-out TARP firms.  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac issue debt to 
investors and then create mortgage-backed securities based on pools 
of mortgages obtained primarily from lenders at banks that actually 
originate the mortgages.
181
  The public has always assumed that Fan-
nie Mae and Freddie Mac’s obligations are backed by the federal gov-
ernment.
182
 
Other writers have observed that Fannie Mae’s enjoyment of an 
implicit federal subsidy operates as a rent because Fannie Mae’s 
access to capital at a resultantly discounted rate affords Fannie Mae a 
politically-created competitive advantage.
183
  Some regulatory benefits 
that are frequently given to governmentally created corporations, and 
which Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac enjoyed, include immunity from 
state taxes, immunity from antitrust laws, immunity from SEC disclo-
sure laws, and more generous capital requirements.
184
  These benefits 
may come in the form of explicit statutory protections or in the form 
of implicit benefits through lax enforcement or implicit guarantees.  
For most of its existence, the dedicated regulator overseeing Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac had few strong enforcement or regulatory 
 
 177 Id. at 586. 
 178 Id. at 555.   
 179 Id.  
 180 See id. 
 181 Carrie Stradley Lavargna, Government Sponsored Enterprises are Too Big to Fail: Ba-
lancing Public and Private Interests, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 991, 1002 (1993). 
 182 Id. at 1011. 
 183 Froomkin, supra note 6, at 580. 
 184 Id. at 584, 604.  
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powers.
185
  Another way that government-controlled companies can 
exert influence is through their ability to hire former government of-
ficials directly.  This was a particularly strong technique for Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac.
186
  The singular exception to the regulatory 
benefits that government-controlled firms receive, particularly in the 
area of disclosure, may be that when the firm comes closer to the 
edge of insolvency, the problem may eventually become too large to 
hide.  For example, although Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac long en-
joyed securities disclosure exemptions,
187
 they came under pressure to 
register with the SEC in 2002 and soon became embroiled in a scan-
dal in 2003 lasting through 2005, which grew as the companies 
neared  insolvency in 2007 and 2008.
188
 
Treasury officials repeatedly expressed that the Treasury did not 
stand behind Fannie Mae’s debt.
189
  Yet the market’s assumption that 
this was not true became something of a self-fulfilling prophecy, as 
the government eventually bailed out Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  
The implicit guarantee permitted Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to 
borrow more cheaply than their risk profile should have allowed, and 
that access to cheap capital permitted them to expand their portfolio 
even further.  By statute, securities of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
must include a disclaimer that the securities are not guaranteed by 
the United States.
190
  Yet in December 2009, the Treasury, in its most 
recent announcement regarding the government guarantee of Fan-
nie Mae and Freddie Mac, announced that it was willing to provide 
an explicit and unlimited guaranty of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s 
debt because it determined that the guaranty of $400 billion, offered 
at the time of conservatorship in 2008, was insufficient.
191
  The pres-
ence of this implicit federal guaranty distorted the price of the firm’s 
securities.
192
 
Estimates of the rents Fannie Mae obtained from its implicit 
Treasury guaranty range from up to 0.75% on its borrowing, and es-
timates of the subsidy transferred through to consumers as an interest 
 
 185 Reiss, supra note 76, at 1033–35. 
 186 Koppell, supra note 95, at 101. 
 187 Id. at 1056. 
 188 Id. at 1036–38. 
 189 Reiss, supra note 76, at 1045. 
 190 Id. at 1023. 
 191 Davis et al., supra note 8, at A1. 
 192 See Benjamin A. Templin, The Public Trust In Private Hands: Social Security and the 
Politics of Government Investment, 96 KY. L.J. 369, 411 (2008). 
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group center around roughly 0.25%.
193
  Thus Fannie Mae passed 
through its rents but did not permit the government to extract its full 
rents.  This is consistent with McChesney’s view of rent extraction be-
cause he does not argue that governments will be able to extract all 
rents but will be limited in their ability to do so.
194
  It is possible that 
Fannie Mae’s market power partially permitted greater bargaining le-
verage, and the more competitive field of 600 TARP financial firm 
recipients will compete for government-conferred rents in such a way 
as the government will be able to extract the full amount of politically 
created rents, and possibly even assets, of the companies privately ob-
tained. 
Some may argue that the passage of financial reform legislation 
through the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protec-
tion Act will make it more difficult for the government to bail out 
firms, even those in which it holds an ownership interest.  This is an 
inaccurate reading of the Act.  The Act will not be able to limit the 
government’s ability to bail out firms.  In fact, it explicitly permits the 
Financial Stability Oversight Council the authority to relax bailout re-
strictions in the bill.
195
  In any case, the executive branch would be 
free to ignore any remaining restrictions because no party would have 
the standing to obtain an injunction to stop the bailout.
196
  Further-
more, a bailout like that passed through Congress in 2008 is also 
possible because Congress can amend prior law to facilitate a future 
bailout.  Indeed, a constitutional amendment is likely the only con-
straint that might limit the prospect of government bailout, as the 
express statutory restrictions on the bailout of Fannie Mae and Fred-
die Mac turned out to be little more than empty promises in 2008. 
The rent transfer system at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac was ex-
plicitly written into its charter, with each interest group that obtained 
rents represented by a director from their groups among the Presi-
dent’s nominees.
197
  The President was given the authority to appoint 
five of the eighteen directors on the board, one of which had to be 
from the home-building industry, one from the mortgage-lending in-
dustry, and one from an organization representing low-income bor-
rowers.
198
 
 
 193 Froomkin, supra note 6, at 600. 
 194 McChesney, supra note 61, at 109. 
 195 See The New Lords of Finance, WALL ST. J., May 24, 2010, at A16. 
 196 See Verret, Treasury Inc., supra note 4, at 311. 
 197 See Reiss, supra note 76, at 1054–55. 
 198 Id. 
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Another rent that government-controlled entities may enjoy is 
that their securities are given preferences when the government regu-
lates the investments of other entities that purchase the debt or equi-
ty of the government-controlled firm.  For example, Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac debt was granted the same status by statute as Treasury 
bonds under fiduciary investor laws and the Federal Reserve regula-
tion of lenders through capital requirements.
199
  In much the same 
way, to give government-backed firms a hand, the Federal Reserve, 
the OCC, and the FDIC could easily use their supervisory powers to 
make inappropriately low assumptions about the risk of investments 
in the assets of bailed-out firms to give institutions investing in those 
assets a lower capital requirement.  This system of preferences has 
continued into 2010, as the Dodd-Frank Act has exempted securities 
issued by Fannie and Freddie from the Volcker Rule’s bank proprie-
tary trading restrictions.
200
 
Some have observed that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have 
used their market power to force firms with which they did business 
to agree to include in their own contracts with customers terms that 
were considered by political actors to be pro-consumer.
201
  Similarly, a 
government-controlled entity like GM could use its leverage over 
suppliers to force their cooperation with emission requirements or 
employment policies in excess of regulatory requirements and 
beyond the equilibrium outcomes of that market. 
Another concept that some have addressed in this context is 
whether the state action doctrine would apply to bailout recipients by 
virtue of the government’s controlling interest.
202
  For Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac, the state action doctrine has been determined to 
apply in some respects.
203
  If the state action doctrine applies, then 
the constraints of the Constitution will apply to that entity, so that, for 
instance, the anti-discrimination strictures of the Bill of Rights will 
apply.  In that case, for example, Citigroup would have to meet the 
enhanced Constitutional requirements such as not disciplining em-
ployees without the opportunity for a hearing, guaranteeing freedom 
of speech for employees, and respecting privacy rights of em-
 
 199 Id. at 1060–64. 
 200 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203 § 619 (2010). 
 201 Reiss, supra note 76, at 1079. 
 202 See, e.g., Stefan Padfield, Finding State Action when Corporations Govern, 82 TEMP. 
L. REV. 703 (2009); see also Templin, supra note 192, at 381.  
 203 See Templin, supra note 192, at 388–89. 
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ployees.
204
  State action doctrine application would represent a signif-
icant cost for the bailed-out entities.  This, however, would do little to 
limit rent-seeking behavior because rent seeking is not unconstitu-
tional.  If it were, the field of public choice may never have been ne-
cessary in the first place.  Thus state action doctrine application is not 
particularly relevant in the context of the problems explored in this 
Article. 
In some ways the government’s control over bailed-out firms is 
even greater than the control it enjoyed over government-sponsored 
enterprises like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  In the case of Fannie 
Mae, the President did not have unfettered authority to replace a ma-
jority of the board, but merely the right to appoint a minority of Fan-
nie Mae directors subject to restrictions on their backgrounds.
205
  This 
right, combined with the regulatory authority exercised by both the 
Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) and the 
Treasury and the implicit guarantee, did provide the government 
with a significant measure of control.
206
  In contrast, with respect to 
many TARP recipients, the government does have the ability to elect 
a majority of the board who can unilaterally replace executives.
207
  
This equity power in the bailed-out entities facilitates the govern-
ment’s ability to make binding rent-seeking and rent-transfer bar-
gains with the bailed-out firms because the government has the assur-
ance that firm executives will keep to the bargain out of fear of 
replacement.  Indeed, it also gives the government greater discretion 
to increase the demands of original bargains and push for further 
rent transfers.  The government’s implicit guarantee may also be eas-
ier at a firm that the government has already bailed out because the 
justification that the taxpayer’s investment will be lost otherwise may 
resonate more powerfully with the public.  Analysis from Moody’s 
credit rating service in fact indicates the market’s understanding that 
when the government exercises a heightened level of control over a 
company, its implied obligation to guarantee that company’s debt is 
assumed to similarly increase.
208
 
Administrative law and private causes of action against the gov-
ernment are one solution to rent seeking.  The hope behind those 
reforms is that interest groups who may otherwise be unable to affect 
the political process may be represented through counsel or may at 
 
 204 See id. 
 205 See Reiss supra note 76, at 1054–55. 
 206 See id. at 1035.  
 207 See Verret, Treasury Inc., supra note 4, at 300–01. 
 208 Reiss, supra note 76, at 1052. 
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least have an incentive to submit comment letters in the rule-making 
process.  As will be discussed, many of the controls put into place to 
limit the public choice challenges to agency and legislative action like 
administrative law, White House Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) review of agency rules, and judicial challenges, are evaded by 
the government’s exercise of power through its TARP holdings as an 
alternative to formal regulatory action.  The observations in the next 
Part will help support this Article’s consideration of an alternative 
method for limiting the reach of government power into the business 
decisions of bailout recipients in the form of ownership trusts. 
IV. THE LIMITS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
This Part will consider how the bailout bill and the Treasury and 
the Federal Reserve’s execution of the bailout under the new legisla-
tion, as well as other programs these two bureaus initiated, interact 
with the restrictions of administrative law and other limits on agency 
action. 
The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA) 
created several new entities.  First, the EESA established the Office of 
Financial Stability within the Treasury
209
 and granted this office the 
authority to implement the programs described within the EESA sub-
ject to the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury.
210
  The EESA 
then established three new entities to oversee the Treasury’s imple-
mentation of the EESA: the Financial Stability Oversight Board 
(FSOB),
211
 the Congressional Oversight Panel,
212
 and the Special In-
spector General for TARP (SIG TARP).
213
  Additionally, the EESA 
vested oversight power in the existing office of the Comptroller Gen-
eral,
214
 who is the director of the Government Accountability Office. 
The threshold inquiry in analyzing the policymaking responsibil-
ities of these entities is whether their actions fall under the mandates 
of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).  The EESA provided that 
any actions of the Secretary of the Treasury, and through him, the 
Office of Financial Stability, would be subject to judicial review under 
the APA.
215
  In creating and empowering the entities above, however, 
 
 209 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, H.R. 1424, 110th Cong. §101 
(2008). 
 210 Id. 
 211 Id. § 104. 
 212 Id. § 125. 
 213 Id. § 121. 
 214 Id. § 116. 
 215 H.R. 1424 § 119. 
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the EESA did not specifically subject their rulemaking actions to the 
APA. 
In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, the Supreme 
Court held that the APA applies to the actions of any agency of the 
federal government unless clear and convincing evidence exists to 
show that Congress sought to exclude the actions of that agency from 
the APA.
216
  The Court affirmed this holding in Heckler v. Chaney, 
when it held that, despite the presumption of APA applicability, Con-
gress may affirmatively preclude APA applicability if Congress ex-
pressed such intent.
217
  The EESA contains no such affirmative preclu-
sion, and therefore the APA applies to any rulemaking authorized by 
the EESA.  Additionally, the only practical manner through which to 
challenge such a rulemaking would be through a judicial challenge 
under the APA, which the EESA technically authorizes subject to the 
wide exceptions below. 
The focus of this Part is on the Treasury, since the EESA’s only 
authorization for direct action applies to the Treasury.  Any dictate 
from the Treasury that is considered a “rule” is subject to the APA 
and must provide for notice and comment procedures.  Any informal 
directive or suggestion from the Treasury that is not a “rule” is not 
subject to administrative constraints. 
The next question is which Treasury actions are “rulemakings” 
under the APA.  The APA defines a “rule” as “an agency statement of 
general or particular applicability and future effect” either “designed 
to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy” or “describing the 
organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency.”
218
  
According to Sugar Cane Growers Cooperative of Florida v. Veneman, a 
leading administrative law case, the key concept is that a rule must be 
of “future effect.”
219
  So, for example, if the Treasury merely exercises 
its power under the EESA to buy stock warrants in Goldman Sachs, 
this can be considered a one-time action without future effect and 
therefore not a rule.  On the other hand, if the Treasury announces 
that only institutions with a market capitalization of ten billion dollars 
will be eligible for federal support through TARP, this has future ef-
fect on policy and would be considered a rule.  This is why the Trea-
sury’s purchases of stock warrants in individual companies, such as its 
initial purchases from ten institutions on October 28, 2008, are not 
rulemakings and therefore not subject to notice and comment. 
 
 216 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971). 
 217 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985). 
 218 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2006). 
 219 See 289 F.3d 89, 95–96 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
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Whether or not one of the Treasury’s actions is in fact consi-
dered “rulemaking,” if the Treasury’s exercise of power through its 
equity holdings is implicit and based on the threat of replacing the 
board of directors or executives at a bailed-out firm, there may be lit-
tle basis to review the Treasury’s exercise of authority.  Indeed, the 
Treasury may not always need to actually exercise that authority but 
instead could indicate its preferences and rely on the firm’s execu-
tives to compete to meet those preferences without the need for offi-
cial communication or action from the Treasury.  In addition, the 
exercise of power at a particular firm may not necessarily meet the 
“future effect” requirement for administrative review.  Finally, the re-
strictions on equitable action in the EESA would limit administrative 
law review even if Treasury’s exercise of power were held to be a 
“rulemaking.” 
The empowering language of the EESA is broad.  Specifically, it 
authorizes the Treasury to “purchase, and to make and fund com-
mitments to purchase, troubled assets from any financial institu-
tion.”
220
  But the initial concept of the EESA was for the Treasury to 
insure “troubled” assets of major financial firms, not purchase equity 
in those firms.
221
  Nevertheless, only eleven days after the EESA was 
passed, the Treasury announced the Capital Purchase Program 
(CPP),
222
 which rather than ensuring or purchasing troubled assets, 
involved direct purchases of equity.  The other major program insti-
tuted by the Treasury under its EESA powers is the Systemically Sig-
nificant Failing Institutions (SSFI) Program; on November 25, 2008, 
the Treasury issued guidelines for the program, which is “designed to 
provide stability and to prevent disruption to financial markets from 
the failure of a systemically significant institution.”
223
  The Treasury 
used the SSFI program to purchase stock and stock warrants in AIG.
224
 
Although informal directives or policy suggestions from the 
Treasury to TARP recipients are not subject to the constraints of the 
APA, this is not to say, however, that such communication is without 
significance.  In their article “Regulation by Deal: The Government’s 
Response to the Financial Crisis,” Steven Davidoff and David Zaring 
argue that, rather than regulating through the rulemaking process, 
the government has used the financial crisis to regulate the financial 
 
 220 H.R. 1424 § 101(a). 
 221 See id. § 102. 
 222 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FIRST TRANCHE REPORT TO CONGRESS 2–3 (2008). 
 223 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THIRD TRANCHE REPORT TO CONGRESS 2 (2008). 
 224 Id. 
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industry through deal making.
225
  The authors point to the interven-
tions authorized by the EESA, as well as to the government-brokered 
purchases of Bear Stearns by J.P. Morgan-Chase and Wachovia by 
Bank of America, as the means by which the government has set new 
rules for the financial sector, most notably the introduction of the 
“too-big-to-fail” doctrine and the preference for bondholders over 
shareholders.
226
  Davidoff and Zaring identify flexibility and speed as 
the benefits of the deal-making approach but note that replacing 
rulemaking with deal making avoids the open government policies of 
administrative law, including notice, comment, judicial review, and 
measured action.
227
 
Existing scholarship and precedent suggests that if the United 
States owns more than half of the outstanding common equity of a 
corporation, or has the power to appoint a majority of that compa-
ny’s board of directors, that company is a state actor for purposes of 
the Constitution and the APA.
228
  This would apply to AIG and Fannie 
Mae in particular.  But there is also countervailing scholarship and 
precedent suggesting that unless the actions of the corporation fulfill 
a traditionally governmental objective, that corporation should not 
be considered a state actor.
229
  Given the applicable law, it is unlikely 
that the Supreme Court would find that AIG is a state actor.  Even if 
the state actor doctrine is in effect, it would do little to limit the prob-
lems examined in this article.  As a general matter, rent seeking is not 
 
 225 Steven Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government’s Response to 
the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463, 466–67 (2009). 
 226 Id. at 474. 
 227 Id. at 468. 
 228 See Froomkin, supra note 6, at 561.  Early nineteenth century cases set the doc-
trine for when a federal corporation is an agency.  The Court set forth the modern 
statement for the doctrine in Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374 (1995).  
Id. The basic test to determine whether a federal corporation is an agency is the find-
ing of a “sufficiently close nexus” between the government and the challenged ac-
tion—based on whether the actor was relying on government assistance, whether the 
actor was performing a traditional government function, or whether the injury was 
incident to government authority.  Id. at 564;  Donna M. Nagy, Playing Peekaboo with 
Constitutional Law: The PCAOB and its Public/Private Status, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
975, 1033 n.378 (2005) (citing Horvath v. Westport Library Ass’n, 362 F.3d 147, 153 
(2d Cir. 2004)).  Some courts use a more flexible approach, looking for indicia of 
control, such as a majority of government appointees on the board, government 
funding, government approval of rules or policies, or government supervision.  Nagy, 
supra, at 1041.  Where the government has taken a temporary debt or equity position 
in a company, a weaker case for calling the entity part of the state exists.  Froomkin, 
supra note 6, at 569 n.132–33.  But Lebron suggests that in a mixed-ownership federal 
corporation, if the United States owns more than half of the shares, or otherwise has 
control, the entity should be considered a state actor.  See id. at 572.   
 229 See discussion and sources cited supra note 228. 
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actionable under constitutional restrictions on government power.  
Indeed, if that were the case, rent seeking would not be as prevalent 
as it is and the public choice literature may never have developed in 
the first place. 
The question of whether action by the Treasury constitutes 
rulemaking is part of the analysis, but the ability to challenge those 
rules is significantly modified by the immunity provisions of the 
EESA.  The EESA’s judicial review provision is somewhat schizoph-
renic.  On one hand, the EESA provides that “actions by the Secretary 
[of the Treasury] pursuant to the authority of this Act shall be subject 
to chapter 7 of title 5, United States Code [the APA judicial review 
provision].”
230
  The EESA then states that “such final actions shall be 
held unlawful and set aside if found to be arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion, or not in accordance with law,”
231
 mirroring the 
standard of judicial review found in the APA.
232
  The EESA, however, 
then provides that “no injunction or other form of equitable relief 
shall be issued against the Secretary for actions pursuant to section 
101, 102, 106, and 109, other than to remedy a violation of the Con-
stitution.”
233
  The sections referenced are the primary sections empo-
wering the bailout.
234
  Since the most important aspects of relief un-
der the APA are equitable,
235
 this latter provision seems to invalidate 
the first provision. 
The notes of the drafters of the legislation in the House seem to 
suggest that the House intended judicial review to be available, stat-
ing that the relevant EESA section “[p]rovides standards for judicial 
review, including injunctive and other relief, to ensure that the ac-
tions of the Secretary are not arbitrary, capricious, or not in accor-
dance with law.”
236
  On the other hand, when considered in light of 
the broad exemptions, the EESA reporting requirements and provi-
sions for oversight of the Treasury’s actions by the SIG TARP, the 
FSOB, the Congressional Oversight Panel, and the Comptroller Gen-
eral seems to indicate that the EESA was designed to rely on over-
 
 230 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, H.R. 1424, 110th Cong. § 
119(a)(1) (2008). 
 231 Id. 
 232 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (2006). 
 233 H.R. 1424 § 119(a)(2)(A). 
 234 See id. §§ 101, 102, 106, 109. 
 235 See 5 U.S.C. § 706. 
 236 H. COMM. ON FIN. SERVS., 111TH CONG, SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE 
LEGISLATION 4 (2009), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/EESABill 
_section-by-section.pdf.  
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sight, rather than judicial review, to constrain the Treasury’s actions.  
The Treasury’s need for speed also reflects Davidoff and Zaring’s 
concept of regulation by deal making—in which the government 
must be able to negotiate deals without the specter of judicial review 
of the final product.  It is worth mentioning here that the entire fi-
nancial crisis and federal bailout has transpired without a single ma-
jor judicial decision.  Suits have been brought to enjoin mergers be-
tween corporations such as the Wachovia, Bank of America, and 
Wells Fargo, but there have been no challenges to the Treasury’s ac-
tions. 
It is unclear how government positions and agencies like the 
Congressional Oversight Panel or the SIG TARP will alter the public 
choice dynamic in place.  Their only power stems from their ability to 
issue reports.  Assuming their interests do not become captive to the 
incentives of the bureaucrats and political actors with whom they 
coordinate, and who nominate them, the reports may serve to minim-
ize informational asymmetries about the performance of government-
controlled corporations.  If, however, the Congressional Oversight 
Panel and the SIG TARP do become captivated by those dynamics, 
then the reports may simply serve to facilitate political actors’ ability 
to force firms to transfer rents to interest groups. 
In sum, administrative law and legal challenges to government 
decisions as a controlling investor offer little in the way of substantive 
constraints on the government’s discretion.  There may be a way to 
limit some, though not all, of the drawbacks to government control 
of companies through the use of ownership trusts as intermediary 
buffers between the government investor and the bailed-out compa-
ny.  The next Part will examine that possibility. 
V. OWNERSHIP TRUSTS AS A PARTIAL REMEDY 
The EESA not only authorizes the Treasury to purchase assets, it 
also grants the “authority to manage troubled assets purchased under 
this Act, including revenues and portfolio risks therefrom.”
237
  Con-
gress introduced bipartisan legislation in both the Senate
238
 and the 
House
239
 to amend the EESA management provision to allow the 
Treasury to delegate management of TARP assets to a trust managed 
on behalf of U.S. taxpayers.  Entitled the TARP Recipient Ownership 
Trust Act (“TARP ROTA”), the legislation would require the Presi-
 
 237 H.R. 1424 § 106(b). 
 238 S. 1723, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 239 H.R. 3594, 111th Cong. (2009). 
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dent to “appoint 3 independent trustees to manage the equity held in 
trust, separate and apart from the United States government.”
240
  It 
also provides that the trustees “have a fiduciary duty to the American 
taxpayer for the maximization of the return on the investment of the 
taxpayer made under the [EESA] in the same manner and to the 
same extent that any director of an issuer of securities has with re-
spect to its shareholders under the securities laws and all applications 
of State law”
241
 and that the trustees “shall serve at the pleasure of the 
President, and may be removed for just cause in violation of their fi-
duciary responsibilities only.”
242
  The TARP ROTA also sets an exit 
date of December 2011 for all TARP investments, with the exception 
of AIG.
243
  The legislation is novel from a corporate law perspective 
because it subjects federal trustees to state corporate law doctrines of 
fiduciary duty.  The provisions are novel from an administrative law 
perspective because of their constraint on the President’s power to 
remove his appointed trustees. 
Many of the provisions in the TARP ROTA are designed to mi-
nimize the public choice incentives that both political actors and 
agency bureaucrats face.  For one, having an explicit exit date for the 
trustees’ investments seems intended to limit the disparity in timing 
for benefits and costs that leads successive government regulators to 
discount the costs of transfers and evade accountability for those costs 
after their term.  The independent nature of the trust is also in-
tended to reduce the trustees’ interests in sharing rent-seeking incen-
tives of interest groups and political actors.  This article will consider 
whether that is actually achievable, but first, it will consider the con-
stitutionality of the trust provisions. 
The starting point for analysis of congressionally imposed re-
strictions on the President’s ability to remove his appointees is admin-
istrative law’s presumption of the unitary executive—that in order for 
the President to be able to fairly perform his executive function, the 
power to appoint officers must include the power to remove them at 
the President’s discretion.  Indeed, the early twentieth-century case of 
Myers v. United States stands for this proposition.244  But the growth of 
the administrative state included the creation of “independent” fed-
eral agencies, such as the Federal Reserve, designed to be somewhat 
immune from presidential coercion.  In 1988, the Supreme Court 
 
 240 Id. § 3(b)(1). 
 241 Id. § 3(c)(3). 
 242 Id. § 3(b)(2)(B). 
 243 Id. § 3(d)(1).  
 244 See 272 U.S. 52, 115 (1926). 
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held in Morrison v. Olson that Congress could limit the President’s 
ability to remove an appointee for “good cause,” so long as the inde-
pendence thereby conferred on that appointee did not impermissibly 
interfere with the President’s constitutional duty to execute the law. 
245
  But the Supreme Court has never ruled on or upheld a removal 
limitation that is any more restrictive than “good cause.”
246
  Thus an 
open question exists as to the constitutionality of the TARP ROTA’s 
limitation of removal to violations of fiduciary duty only.  Under Mor-
rison, the provision is presumably unconstitutional if it impermissibly 
interferes with the President’s constitutional duty to execute the 
law.
247
 
Agency statutes are typically silent about the grounds for remov-
al of officers.
248
  Those statutes that do provide grounds for removal, 
including the statutes creating the FTC
249
 and SEC,
250
 typically copy 
the language of the Act to Regulate Commerce of 1887, which states 
that officers can be removed for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or mal-
feasance in office.”
251
  The concept of removal for breach of duty, 
therefore, has a long history.  But the Court has not defined the 
terms “neglect of duty,” “malfeasance in office,” or “inefficiency.”
252
  
Additionally, the presumably more limiting provision of removal only 
“for cause” has never been defined
253
 or even been challenged in 
court.
254
 
What, then, are the bounds of the President’s discretion?  In 
Wiener v. United States, the Court suggested that removal “for cause” 
had to involve the “rectitude” of an official, not merely a policy disa-
greement with the President.
255
  But leading administrative law scho-
 
 245 487 U.S. 654, 689–90 (1988). 
 246 Michael A. Carvin et al., Massive, Unchecked Power by Design: The Unconstitutional 
Exercise of Executive Authority by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 4 N.Y.U. 
J. L. & BUS. 199, 220 (2007). 
 247 487 U.S. at 689–90. 
 248 Marshall J. Berger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and Opera-
tion of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 1144 (2000). 
 249 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2006). 
 250 15 U.S.C. §78d (2006).  See also MFS Secs. Corp. v. S.E.C., 380 F.3d 611, 619 (2d 
Cir. 2004). 
 251 Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104 § 11, 24 Stat. 379, 383 (1887); Berger & 
Edles, supra note 248, at 1144. 
 252 Lawrence Lessig & Cass Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 110 (1994). 
 253 Id. 
 254 Tracy A. Hardin, Rethinking Independence: The Lack of an Effective Remedy for Im-
proper For-Cause Removals, 50 VAND. L. REV. 197, 199 (1997). 
 255 357 U.S. 349, 356 (1958). 
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lars argue that “for cause” removal offers the President significant 
discretion.  Lawrence Lessig and Cass Sunstein contend that removal 
“for cause” as well as “neglect of duty” or “malfeasance in office” al-
lows the President “substantive supervision” and the ability to dis-
charge officers who “acted in ways inconsistent with the President’s 
wishes with respect to what is required by sound policy.”
256
  Peter 
Strauss argues that under a “for cause” standard, a court could sustain 
removal of an independent agency officer for refusing to follow a 
presidential directive.
257
  If the President’s removal power truly is this 
broad, even under the “for cause” standard that Morrison blessed, 
then the removal limitation in the TARP ROTA may be unconstitu-
tional.  If, however, “for cause” restricts the President to grounds 
based on “failure in trust,” rather than “breach of discipline,”
258
 then 
the Constitution may allow room for the TARP ROTA provision. 
During the execution of the bailout, the government actually 
created an ownership trust to house its investment for one bailout re-
cipient, demonstrating some of the pitfalls to a poorly designed trust 
structure.  The Federal Reserve established an ownership trust to 
manage its investment in AIG.
259
  Recent news reports have hig-
hlighted the Treasury’s delegation of authority to an independent 
trust that manages the government’s interest in AIG.
260
  In the deal 
documents authorizing the exchange of Citigroup preferred shares 
for the government’s voting equity, the Treasury highlighted a plan 
for a similar trust arrangement for management of the government’s 
interest in Citigroup.
261
  Over two years later, that trust still has yet to 
be created. 
When he was still the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York (FRBNY), Secretary Timothy Geithner established the AIG 
Credit Facility Trust Agreement (“AIG Trust”).
262
  This trust gives 
 
 256 Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 252, at 111. 
 257 Peter Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the 
Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 667 n.402 (1984). 
 258 Id. at 615. 
 259 See J.W. Verret, Testimony Before the House Oversight Committee Concerning the AIG 
Trust 1 (George Mason L.& Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 09-27, 2009), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1408188. 
 260 See e.g. Edmund L. Andrews, 3 Trustees of A.I.G. Are Quiet, Perhaps to a Fault, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 20, 2009, at B1.  
 261 Id. 
 262 See FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., AIG CREDIT FACILITY TRUST AGREEMENT § 2.03 
(Jan. 16, 2009), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/ 
AIGCFTAgreement.pdf. 
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three trustees (“AIG Trustees”) the power and responsibility for man-
aging and disposing of the federal government’s shares in AIG.
263
 
A number of provisions in the AIG Trust are controversial.  The 
AIG Trust protects the AIG Trustees from liability if they act lawfully 
and in “the best interests of the Treasury.”
264
  It further indemnifies 
the AIG Trustees “for any loss, cost or expense of any kind or charac-
ter whatsoever,” so long as the AIG Trustees had no reasonable cause 
to believe their actions were unlawful.
265
  Finally, the AIG Trust re-
moves standard fiduciary duties the AIG Trustees have to the other 
shareholders.
266
  For example, the AIG Trust does not employ the 
standard practice of prohibiting company directors from taking ad-
vantage of business opportunities that may be of use to the company 
they serve for private benefit.  The AIG Trust states that no trustee 
will be obligated to “present any business activity, investment oppor-
tunity (or so called corporate opportunity) or prospective economic 
advantage to the FRBNY, the Treasury or [AIG], even if the opportu-
nity is of the character that, if presented to the FRBNY, the Treasury 
or [AIG], could be taken by it.”
267
  The annual compensation for each 
of the trustees is $100,000 a year.
268
  Removal provisions restrict the 
Federal Reserve’s ability to remove the trustees only “for cause.”
269
 
The removal limitations in the TARP ROTA might help to elim-
inate some of the public choice constraints on trustees.  And yet the 
bureaucrats at independent agencies have the same removal limita-
tion, but are still the focus of much of the public choice evidence 
cited above.  The term limits in the TARP ROTA are a good first step 
to limit the ability of trustees to create rent-seeking and rent-transfer 
networks.  The provision in the TARP ROTA providing for an explicit 
exit date may minimize some of the term-related issues analyzed in 
this article with respect to bureaucrat’s incentives in controlling and 
guaranteeing firms, particularly if the term limit coincides with the 
term of the administrative official overseeing the program, or at the 
very least the term of a President. 
One of the issues underlying the analysis in McChesney, Tullock, 
Stearns and Zywicki, and other scholars’ views on rent seeking which 
deserves further thought, and which would inform this analysis, 
 
 263 Id.  
 264 Id. § 2.05(a). 
 265 Id. § 3.03(d). 
 266 Id.  
 267 Id. § 3.05(b). 
 268 FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., § 3.04(a). 
 269 Id. § 3.02. 
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would be the time period required for rent-seeking networks to de-
velop.  For instance, McChesney mentions that newly elected politi-
cians can more easily threaten to vitiate prior bargains with rent-
seeking firms,
270
 and Tullock notes that firms will compete for rents in 
ways that actually dissipate those rents for the firms.
271
  But the length 
of time required for the individuals involved to develop reputational 
capital with each other, commitment mechanisms, specialization, and 
learning will affect the time period necessary for rent-seeking net-
works to develop. 
In the midst of unverifiable information or information asymme-
tries about the value of rents to firms, or the absence of the quantifi-
able threat that a rent-extraction attempt by a legislator actually poses 
to a firms’ earnings, networks of relationships between firms, interest 
groups, lobbying groups, and elected officials develop through which 
all of the rent seekers and rent providers negotiate over the value of 
the rents provided.  As such, trust becomes an inherent part of those 
negotiation networks and the development of mutual trust takes 
time.  One simple explanation is the game theory example of repeat 
competitions in the absence of external bonds as vital to establishing 
trust between players.  But the question is how long it takes for those 
networks to establish.  Although a TARP recipient may have lobbied 
the government prior to its taking government backing, the precise 
dynamic of its interaction with government and interest groups would 
be entirely novel at the point of bailout.  As such, establishing the 
trust necessary to facilitate rent-seeking and transfer activities may 
take time even if established networks existed prior to the bailout.  
Some analysis of the time window for those activities may shed more 
light into the time limits for full privatization of the government’s 
ownership, which may be advisable.  For instance, it may be the case 
that Fannie Mae’s rent-seeking networks are so deeply established at 
this point that no form of trust holdings will solve the problem, whe-
reas, the government did not own Bank of America long enough to 
establish networks, it was able to exit TARP and repay its bailout 
funding more easily and therefore would have been an ideal bailout 
recipient for which ownership through an intermediary trust could 
have served to limit rent seeking costs. 
A limited term for the trust written into its authorizing charter is 
one of the best options to limit political conflicts for trustees.  The 
TARP ROTA sets a specific date by which the government must liqui-
 
 270 McChesney, supra note 61, at 102. 
 271 Tullock, Efficient Rent Seeking, supra note 57, at 103–07. 
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date its positions in many firms, with the exception of AIG.
272
  Anoth-
er approach for future trusts could be to set the expiration date as 
coinciding with the National Bureau of Economic Research Business 
Cycle Dating Committee’s determination at the National Bureau of 
Economic Research that a recession has ended, something to the ef-
fect that the government’s position will need to be “sold out one year 
after the next determination by the Business Cycle Dating Committee 
that the economy is no longer in recession.” 
Another method to try and evade the public choice problems of 
government ownership is to require that members of the govern-
ment-ownership trust be high net-asset individuals who have finished 
their careers in the private sector.  If assertions about the diminishing 
marginal utility of wealth are credible, nominees might be expected 
to be at the high end of that curve.
273
  As such, private rent-seeking 
behavior is not likely to motivate their decision to volunteer for ser-
vice as a trustee, as the benefits to them may not measure up in their 
individual work or leisure-indifference curves.
274
  The question then 
remains, why would they serve as a trustee?  Two incentives are readi-
ly apparent, neither of which are readily quantifiable.  One rests on 
notions of public service—giving back to the community after the ac-
cretion of wealth, which seems to be a bedrock principle of many 
high net-worth individuals informing their philanthropy.  The other 
would be reputational benefits—that the challenge of managing the 
taxpayer’s investment, and turning around the failed institutions 
bailed-out by the government, presents a unique opportunity for 
bragging rights for retired Wall Street executives. 
The indemnification provisions in the U.K. Limited Trust
275
 es-
tablished to manage its bank bailout and the Federal Reserve’s AIG 
Trust for trustees is highly relevant to this motivation.  Trustees moti-
vated to serve by reputational or public-service goals may nevertheless 
remain concerned about placing their private wealth, as well as 
wealth similarly budgeted toward social philanthropy causes, at risk 
through their service.  In the absence of a clear indemnification pro-
vision in the ownership trust documents, the candidates for service 
 
 272 H.R. 3594, 111th Cong. § 3 (2009). 
 273 See Richard A. Easterlin, Income and Happiness: Towards a Unified Theory, 11 
ECON. J. 465, 473 (2001). 
 274 See id. 
 275 See OFFICE FOR NATIONAL STATISTICS, PUBLIC SECTOR INTERVENTIONS IN THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS 40 (July 2009), available at 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/articles/nojournal/Financial-crisis.pdf.  See also Verret, 
Separation of Bank and State, supra note 50. 
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may face a tradeoff between use of funds toward philanthropy goals 
and use of funds to underwrite the costs of legal defense.  What is 
clear, however, is that if the indemnification is contingent on abiding 
by a fiduciary duty to the best interests of the Treasury, as is the case 
with the AIG trust, then the government can threaten to withhold in-
demnification of trustees to exert leverage over them and vitiate the 
intent of the trust. 
That is not to say that the generous indemnification provisions 
included in both the AIG Trust and the U.K. Limited Trust are re-
quired to achieve that end.  A restriction on indemnification, similar 
to that required in Delaware corporations, to permit indemnification 
only for actions taken in a good faith decision to advance the inter-
ests of the entity could serve the same purpose.
276
  Such a provision 
might streamline the incentives of the trustees toward maximizing 
the value of the taxpayer’s investment while at the same time ignor-
ing political pressure from the Treasury and the Congress to accede 
to political pressure to facilitate rent seeking or off-budget transfer 
activity. 
One question apparent in the issue of using liability rules to nar-
row the interests of trustees would be determining which parties have 
standing to sue the trustees.  The question of trustee indemnification 
is moot unless someone can sue the trustees.  It is unclear who might 
have standing and the desire to do so if the trustees are bending to 
the political will of the government actors who appointed them.  This 
could overburden the trust with a torrent of litigation.  Taxpayer 
standing to challenge policy decisions in the spending and steward-
ship of the taxpayer’s interest has been severely constrained for that 
very reason. 
Taxpayer standing is fraught with problems, and though it might 
be an option to grant by statute it is typically otherwise strongly li-
mited in the courts.
277
  One method that may be workable would be to 
grant standing to the Attorney General of the United States, but 
again, his interest in punishing trustees for bending to the political 
will of the executive branch may be limited because of conflicts he 
faces as a political appointee.  An alternative method may be to grant 
standing to the fifty state attorneys general to sue on behalf of their 
state pension funds in the event that their pension funds invest in 
 
 276 Karl E. Stauss, Indemnification in Delaware: Balancing Policy Goals and Liabilities, 
29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 143, 155 (2004). 
 277 See Templin, supra note 192, at 417. 
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TARP recipients under shareholder-control-person liability.
278
  
Another option is to provide standing for qui tam actions that relate 
to shareholder-control-person liability for employees at bailout reci-
pients.
279
  Some have argued that courts are not subject to the same 
public choice challenges as the legislative and executive branches, 
and as such could be in a better position to stop actionable rent-
seeking behavior.
280
 
Legislation can provide a very narrow set of plaintiffs with stand-
ing to sue the trustees for violation of their fiduciary duties.  State 
pension funds have vast holdings, and one might expect that the ma-
jority of TARP recipients have state pension funds as investors.  The 
TARP trustees, as controlling shareholders of many of the TARP re-
cipients, will have fiduciary duties to the other shareholders in the 
TARP recipients that are also publicly traded, as most of them are.  If 
the bailout bill were amended to give standing to state attorneys gen-
eral to sue the trustees of the TARP trust for violations of the fidu-
ciary duty to their fellow shareholders and if it were alleged that those 
trustees were acceding to political pressure, those facts may limit the 
universe of plaintiffs such that the accountability method would be 
more manageable and cost-effective.  State pension funds face politi-
cal conflicts of their own in their exercise of shareholder power.
281
  
But where that power is constrained in its application to merely fidu-
ciary duty lawsuits, the political conflicts may be less important. 
A limitation on the President’s ability to remove the trustees 
seems advisable to break the rent-seeking cycle in this context.  Sev-
eral of the independent agencies, such as the SEC, the FBI, and the 
CIA, have a similar limitation on the President’s power to remove 
where it has been deemed advisable to maintain an independent 
agency.
282
  A financial industry work-experience requirement, similar 
to that required for members of the Canadian Pension Plan Board, 
may also be advisable.
283
  A prohibition against any member of the 
government, or anyone who has worked in government in the recent 
 
 278 For a thorough analysis of controlling shareholder liability in the context of 
TARP recipients, see generally Verret, Treasury Inc., supra note 4. 
 279 See Templin, supra note 192, at 420. 
 280 See Donald Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Reassessing the Role of the Independent 
Judiciary in Enforcing Interest Group Bargains, 5 CONST. POL. ECON. 1, 2 (1994). 
 281 See generally Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Gover-
nance Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795 (1993) (discussing political influence on 
public pension funds). 
 282 Templin, supra note 192, at 391. 
 283 Id. at 400. 
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past, should apply to membership on the board of trustees.
284
  Al-
though a limited term for the trust is still this Article’s primary rec-
ommendation, in the event that the trust has an indefinite life it 
should, at the very least, contain staggered terms for members so that 
no single President can stack the board.
285
  This, in combination with 
a limitation on removal powers, will limit rent seeking because even if 
trustees entered into bargains with legislators in advance they could 
not be held to those bargains.  Or, the board of trustees can be set up 
such that its membership is half nominated by each party, similar to 
the FEC. 
Another provision in the AIG Trust that should be replicated in 
future trusts is the provision that the expenses of the trust should be 
covered by the firms themselves rather than by budgets approved by 
the government.  This will limit any budget growth incentives the 
trustees may otherwise have. 
At first blush, compensating the trustees in a manner commen-
surate with compensation for managers of private wealth might seem 
consistent, as it may give them incentives to maximize the value of the 
taxpayer’s investment.  But where the presence of an implicit guaran-
tee and where the other politically-conferred rents can be capitalized 
into the value of the firm’s securities, it would give the trustees an in-
centive to facilitate that behavior.  It might also encourage them to 
facilitate use of the bailed-out firm as a vehicle for rent transfer of a 
percentage of those rents, if it was part of the bargain.  Alternatively, 
it may lead the government to agree to sever the link between com-
pensation and performance as part of the rent-seeking bargain.  Both 
of these problems were, and continue to be, present at Fannie Mae 
and at Freddie Mac.
286
 
An alternative method explored in this Article may simply be 
mandating that the trustees only vote in accordance with a propor-
tional voting policy.  The government’s securities would then be 
voted in proportion to the percentages of votes of all other share-
holders in the firm.  If sixty percent of the non-government share-
holders voted in favor of board incumbents and forty percent voted 
against them, the government trustees would be required to also vote 
sixty percent of the government’s shares in favor of management 
nominees and forty percent of the shares against them.  This voting 
 
 284 Id. 
 285 See id. at 402. 
 286 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, Executive Compensation at Fannie Mae: A 
Case Study of Perverse Incentives, Non-Performance Pay, and Camouflage, 30 J. CORP. L. 807, 
807 (2004). 
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method has similarly been recommended in the analogous area of 
broker-street voting.
287
 
In her recent paper, Professor Emma Coleman Jordan argues 
for an approach diametrically opposed to the approach offered in 
this Article.
288
  Jordan argues in favor of placing public directors onto 
the boards of TARP recipients.
289
  She would place solely individuals 
with public sector careers onto the boards of directors of TARP reci-
pients.
290
  She justifies her approach in part on the basis of the need 
to restore the “trust of the American public.”
291
  She also justifies it on 
the basis of maintaining corporate accountability to taxpayer share-
holders.
292
  Throughout the paper the analysis shifts between a profit-
maximization focus of stopping bailout recipients from taking im-
prudent risks and a social-welfare focus of making the business com-
munity more diverse.
293
 
She also argues that the representation of government appoin-
tees on bailout-recipient boards should be in proportion to the fund-
ing received by the firm as a percentage of its market capitalization.
294
  
This ignores the state corporate law structure under which bailout re-
cipients are organized, which do not provide for proportional repre-
sentation as a default, and the proxy machinery under which compa-
nies solicit votes, which also does not provide for proportional voting 
and instead mandates that shareholders in most circumstances have 
the opportunity to vote in proportion to their voting equity holdings 
for all board of directors candidates. 
Jordan also argues that these public directors should be required 
to display a history of public service and show intellectual and back-
ground diversity, including a mandate that the public directors have a 
 
 287 U.S. S.E.C. BRIEFING PAPER: ROUNDTABLE ON PROXY VOTING MECHANICS (May 23, 
2007), http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/proxyprocess/proxyvotingbrief.htm.  The 
United States Thrift Savings Fund, a government run pension plan, also has a share-
holder voting restriction which limits the government’s flexibility to vote its shares.  
See Deborah Weiss, The Regulation of Funded Social Security, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 993, 1000 
(1998). 
 288 See EMMA COLEMAN JORDAN, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, A FAIR DEAL FOR TAXPAYER 
INVESTMENTS: PUBLIC DIRECTORS ARE NECESSARY TO RESTORE TRUST AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY AT COMPANIES RESCUED BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 1–3 (Sept. 2009), 
available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/09/pdf/public_ 
directors.pdf.  
 289 Id. at 1. 
 290 Id. at 2. 
 291 Id. at 1.  
 292 Id. 
 293 See, e.g., id. at 2, 15. 
 294 JORDAN, supra note 288, at 2. 
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history of experience outside of the economic sector.
295
  But aside 
from a general allegation that private sector directors engage in 
“groupthink,” she fails to link her assertion with any evidence that the 
public directors will enhance the earnings prospects of the TARP re-
cipients.
296
  She also makes a faulty assumption common to many 
supporters of the corporate social-responsibility movement that “so-
cially responsible goals,” which are often poorly defined, are congru-
ent with the wealth-maximization norm and offer the accountability 
advantages of the wealth-maximization norm, both of which are often 
lacking in support.
297
 
A primary criticism of her view is that, without some kind of reli-
able buffer between political actors and TARP recipients, the public 
choice challenges examined in this Article would remain.  A second-
ary, and far more powerful, critique of her argument is that her sug-
gestion would, by a significant order of magnitude, exacerbate the 
public choice problems of government-controlled firms as it would 
add new rent seekers to the dynamic, potentially increasing the com-
petition for rents and increasing rent-dissipation costs. 
First, public interest careerists are the most highly prone to the 
bureaucratic careerism issues examined previously.  Jordan assumes 
that the taxpayer’s interest and the interest of directors appointed by 
political actors coincide,
298
 but this faulty assumption must at least ad-
dress the public choice critiques of government decision making to 
have any resonance.  Public interest careerists would be the most mo-
tivated individuals to use their position to facilitate post-exit oppor-
tunities for employment.  Second, public directors would be the ap-
pointees with the most experience in coordinating with elected 
officials to facilitate expropriation of rents as well as coordinating 
with elected officials to coordinate their granting of politically con-
ferred rents through exchange. 
Professor Jordan’s proposal would only increase rent-seeking 
costs.  The verdict on ownership trusts appears to be mixed.  If prop-
erly designed, they may be able to minimize some of the drawbacks to 
government ownership of firms if properly designed.  And though 
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 298 See JORDAN, supra note 288, at 6. 
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some tweaks may be required to the TARP ROTA, it appears to be a 
step in the right direction. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The government’s ownership stakes in bailout recipients is the 
result of a predictable political calculation.  Where the government 
has offered injections of capital on terms as generous as the bailout 
of 2008, politicians may have felt that the political backlash would be 
untenable without creating instruments sufficient to give the taxpayer 
an opportunity to reap the benefits of share-price appreciation once 
the financial crisis receded and the government’s backing allowed 
the bailout recipients to return to profitability.  This Article does not 
endorse the decision to bail out firms in 2008, nor does it endorse 
the government’s decision to take equity stakes in bailed-out firms.  
The question it has attempted to address is how to manage the after-
math of those decisions from an ownership and governance perspec-
tive in light of the public choice dynamics that can be expected to 
develop. 
The consequence of the Treasury’s decision to take equity stakes 
in bailed-out firms is that government political actors and bureaucrats 
now have an unprecedented level of control over the productive re-
sources of the American economy.  The instances of government 
pressure addressed by various media outlets hint at the costs that con-
trol could mean for taxpayer returns and economic efficiency.  The 
insights of public choice theory, particularly as they are adapted in 
this Article to the unique circumstance of government ownership of 
equity, provide an even stronger basis for concern. 
The threat on the horizon is that many of the bailed-out firms 
will settle into a dynamic similar to that seen in Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac, and use their politically conferred rents to subsidize 
transfers of resources off of the federal budget to politically powerful 
interest groups.  Even worse, they may become so strongly captured 
by their government owners that they become vehicles for transfer of 
their privately held rents and other assets, and thereby become fully 
dependant on the government’s implicit backing to remain solvent.  
This Article’s analysis of bureaucratic and political actor incentives 
reveals that the implicit guarantee, though it is unlikely to endure, 
can do so long enough to give multiple presidential administrations 
and Congresses an incentive to continue the feedback loop.  That is 
not to say that all bailed-out firms will inevitably go the way of Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac, but the threat is nevertheless too great to ig-
nore in light of this Article’s analysis. 
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Independent trusts, similar to those intended by the TARP 
ROTA, have some limited potential to serve as a buffer between the 
government and private firms and alleviate the public choice conflicts 
of direct government ownership.  This will require a careful construc-
tion of the trusts, as well as careful consideration of the incentives of 
those who serve as trustees.  This analysis stands in marked contrast to 
the contrary suggestion of Professor Jordan that bailout recipients 
should be required to have “public directors” that the government 
controls. 
 
